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Undue Sacrifice: How Female Sexual Assault Victims Fight the
Military While Fighting in the Military
BY RUSSELL SPIVAK*
Over the last century, women have fought for the right to serve their nation in the
exact same way men have: in uniform. Women have indeed made enormous strides toward
serving in equal measure to their male counterparts. But women are still too often perceived
and treated as second-class citizens, inhibiting a genuine realization of their equality in the
armed forces. This is exhibited, if not reinforced, by the prevalence of women’s sexual
assault while serving their country and the insufficient prosecution thereof. By diagnosing
and remedying the insufficiencies in the military justice system’s legal regime governing
the prosecution of military sexual assault as well as victim’s insufficient means of redress
in civilian courts, we may be able to secure more prosecutions of attackers. This article
looks to address this problem. It begins with a background on women’s growing
participation in the military, both in how far women have come and what is left to achieve.
Section II examines the specific problem of military sexual assault, including its
prevalence, impact on the military at large, and the inadequate prosecution process. Section
III looks at strategies, both enacted and untaken, to eradicate these underlying causes.
Section IV discusses how to change the system to allow victims a realistic shot at pursuing
and attaining justice. Section V details a recent case that may open the floodgates for female
victims to assert their rights in federal courts, Doe v. Hagenbeck. The article concludes
with a recap of the substantive points made as well as a few final thoughts.
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INTRODUCTION
[F]or those who are in uniform who have experienced sexual assault, I want them
to hear directly from their Commander-In-Chief that I’ve got their backs . . . . And
anybody in the military who has knowledge of this stuff should understand this
is not who we are. This is not what the U.S. military is about. And it dishonors
the vast majority of men and women in uniform who carry out their
responsibilities and obligations with honor and dignity and incredible courage
every single day. So bottom line is I have no tolerance for this . . . . I expect
consequences. So I don’t want just more speeches or awareness programs or
training but, ultimately, folks look the other way. If we find out somebody is
engaging in this stuff, they’ve got to be held accountable — prosecuted, stripped
of their positions, court-martialed, fired, dishonorably discharged. Period. It’s not
acceptable.
– Barack Obama1

Earlier this year, Lynn Hall bravely detailed in the New York Times the
harrowing story of her rape.2 Having been offered help by a male superior, Ms.
Hall agreed to meet.3 The meeting did not go as planned: her superior “raped [her]
in a secluded area” where the two were supposed to work together.4 Ms. Hall’s
horrifying story was just beginning:
I told no one, not even a few days later when I developed symptoms of a
sexually transmitted disease — herpes. Not even two weeks later, when the
herpes virus traveled to my nervous system and spread to my spinal cord and
the tissue around my brain, causing meningitis. I was immediately admitted
into the . . . intensive care unit, but when the . . . doctor asked me if I was
sexually active, I said no. I wouldn’t dare risk my career by telling him the
truth of what had happened to me; so the virus that caused my infection went
untreated.5

But there is one detail that makes Ms. Hall’s story both unique and entirely
commonplace: it occurred while she was in military uniform.6 The episode took
place when she was just 18 and a cadet at the United States Air Force Academy in
Colorado Springs, Colorado.7 The superior was a senior cadet, and the risk of
reporting the incident was unquestionably real: creating dissension within the
ranks could most certainly have derailed her career trajectory as an aspiring pilot.8
1. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by President Obama and President Park of South
Korea in a Joint Press Conference (May 7, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/07/remarks-president-obama-and-president-park-south-korea-joint-press-confe.
2. Lynn K. Hall, Opinion, What Happens When a Rape Goes Unreported, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2017, at
SR6.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id. See also LINDSAY ROSENTHAL & LAWRENCE KORB, TWICE BETRAYED: BRINGING JUSTICE
TO THE U.S. MILITARY’S SEXUAL ASSAULT PROBLEM, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, 9 (Nov. 2013),
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Perversely, her silence undermined her promising career potential; Ms. Hall was
medically discharged within two years of the alleged rape due to the enormous
medical constraints of her meningitis and its subsequent treatments, including “a
peripheral nerve stimulator implanted near [her] brain, which made it possible for
[her] to work and exercise again” but nevertheless left her in “pain daily.”9
Even more strikingly, Ms. Hall’s tenure at the Academy overlapped with an
infamous 2003 20/20 news report in which seven female cadets came forward to
speak about a systemic sexual culture permeating the student body, sharing
similar stories of upperclassman preying on more junior cadets.10 In fact, Ms. Hall
notes an exchange that took place between two classmates of hers regarding the
report:
The senior cadet at the table asked, “What do you think of those whores who
are tarnishing our academy?” The first-year across from me answered, “Sir, I
think a woman who gets herself raped isn’t strong enough to defend herself,
let alone the country, and shouldn’t be in the military.”
“Couldn’t agree more,” the senior cadet said.11

Despite the fact that both Ms. Hall’s rape and the 20/20 report were over a
decade ago, current statistics on military sexual assaults make it abundantly clear
that the problem is far from eradicated;12 indeed, it continues to permeate not just
the Air Force Academy, but the military at large. Ms. Hall’s disturbing ordeal is
unfortunately just one of thousands of sexual assaults perpetrated by and against
members of our nation’s armed forces—particularly by males against females.
Admittedly, this problem is not solely borne by females: in fact, servicemen
are subjected to sexual assault in higher gross numbers than servicewomen.13 But,
there is one aspect of the problem that is uniquely female: despite significant
progress, women remain relegated to second-class citizenship in the armed forces.
With women in the military viewed as lesser than men, it is unsurprising that
sexual assaults occur at startlingly higher rates against women than men.14 Such
disproportionate rates are a substantial impediment to realizing genuine equality
between our servicemen and servicewomen.

https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/MilitarySexualAssaultsReport.pdf
(“All too often, victims are forced out of the military as a means of retaliation for reporting the crimes
committed against them. Others have left the careers they loved because the military could not or
would not protect them from sexual violence at the hands of their peers and superiors.”)
9. Hall, supra note 3.
10. See Air Force Academy Ignores Rapes, Women Say, ABC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2003), http://abcnews.
go.com/2020/story?id=123748&page=1.
11. Hall, supra note 3.
12. See infra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
13. See NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE U.S.
MILITARY, at xviii (Andrew R. Morral, Kristie Gore & Terry Schell, eds., 2014). (“Our best estimate in
this range is that 20,300 active-component service members were sexually assaulted in the past year,
out of 1,317,561 active-component members.”).
14. Id. at 9. (“The estimated rate of sexual assault varied significantly by gender: fewer than 1 in
100 men but approximately 1 in 20 women, resulting in an estimated 10,600 servicemen and 9,600
servicewomen who experienced a sexual assault in the past year.”).
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This paper aims to address these problems head on so that we may begin to
rectify these gross inequities, particularly military sexual assault.15
If we are to remedy these problems, we must begin by asking the right
questions. Scholars must ask about the root cause of sexual assault’s pervasiveness
and impact throughout the military. Lawmakers must ask why victims have been
barred from civil remedies and how such avenues may be reopened. And victims
must ask how they can seek to have their right to be free from sexual assault and
rape upheld. This paper aims to answer each of these questions.
To do so, this article begins with a background on the women’s movement
with respect to the military, both in how far women have come and what’s left for
women to achieve. Section II looks at the specific problem of military sexual
assault from all angles, including how prevalent it is, its impact on the military at
large, and how it is prosecuted—largely unsuccessfully. With these problems
explained in depth, the article subsequently looks at how strategies, both ratified
and unenacted, eradicate these underlying causes. Next, this article discusses how
we may be able to change the system such that victims may have a realistic shot at
pursuing and attaining justice. Then, the article details an important case that may
well open the floodgates for female victims to assert their rights in federal courts:
Doe v. Hagenbeck.16 The article then concludes with a recap of the substantive points
made, as well as a few final thoughts.
I. IN PURSUIT OF SOCIAL CHANGE: WOMEN’S PURSUIT OF MILITARY EQUALITY
The U.S. Naval Act of 1916, also known as the “Big Navy Act,” opened the
military to female enlistment during World War I.17
“The Act,” which called for a build-up of the U.S. Navy from ships to
personnel used the term ‘persons’ when referring to recruitment, rather than
‘men.’18 As a result, and due to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniel’s
support, the Navy opened recruitment to women in reserve ranks.19

15. Recognizing that some of the problems and solutions are universal across both genders, the
paper denotes aspects of the social movement gender unanimity when appropriate.
16. 98 F.Supp.3d 672 (2015).
17. See 1917: Yeomanettes, UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, https://usnwcarchive.org/
exhibits/show/nwc-women-in-navy/nwc-women-wwi (last accessed Mar. 6, 2017).
18. See id.
19. Id. As the story goes, “Daniels was struggling to meet the needs of personnel required to
handle jobs on naval shore stations. ‘Is there any law that says a yeoman must be a man?’ Daniels asked
his legal advisors. When told that the answer was ‘no’, Daniels responded, ‘Then enroll women in the
Naval Reserve as yeoman.’ On August 29, 1916, a new class of female yeoman, known as Yeoman (F),
or, more popularly, ‘yeomanettes’, was established in the Navy. Approximately 12,000 women served
on active duty as yeomanettes during World War I ‘in order to release enlisted men for active service
at sea.’” NATIONAL MUSEUM OF AMERICAN JEWISH MILITARY, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: A JEWISH
PERSPECTIVE 13 (1999). That said, the incredible stories of women like Deborah Sampson and Elizabeth
Newcom who disguised themselves as men in the Revolutionary and Mexican Wars, respectively, see
Time Line: Women in the United States Military, THE COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG FOUNDATION,
http://www.history.org/history/teaching/enewsletter/volume7/images/nov/women_military_timeline.
pdf (last accessed Mar. 6, 2017), so that they could serve their countries prior to this official opening are
worthy of unending admiration and praise.
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Immediately after World War I ended, women largely left the military to
return to “normalcy,”20 but once the United States entered World War II, women
once again fought for the right to serve their country. Edith Nourse Rogers, one of
the first women to ever serve in Congress, proposed a bill to provide for a female
contingent of non-combat, non-nurse troops.21 Notably, the bill was introduced
months in advance of Pearl Harbor—May 28, 1941—but was only signed into law
the following March after the United States had officially entered the fight.22 The
day after the law was signed, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the creation
of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC).23 These women would be the
first to serve their country in uniform in roles other than nursing,24 and serve ably
and valiantly they did.25
After the Japanese surrendered on the deck of the USS Missouri, Dwight
Eisenhower, then the Army Chief of Staff, encouraged women’s retention and reenlistment for military service as part of the regular Army.26 Given the program’s
successes, Congress passed the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act in 1948,27
enabling women to serve in all four branches of the military during peacetime.28
Again, they proved equal to the task, answering the call to serve as needed. For
example, “At the time the [Korean War] broke out in 1950, there were about 22,000
women in the armed forces, with roughly one-third in nursing or health-related
jobs. . . . At its peak, the number of women in the armed forces during the Korean
Conflict was 48,700, declining to about 35,000 by war’s end in June 1955.”29
“During the 1960s, the clash between traditional views of women’s roles and
the social movement for equal opportunity for women resonated throughout the
20. During this time period, however, military commanders continued to theorize how women
could be utilized if and when future conflicts broke out. See MATTIE E. TREADWELL, THE WOMEN’S ARMY
CORPS 10–15 (1953), http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Wac/index.htm.
21. See BETTIE J. MORDEN, THE WOMEN’S ARMY CORPS, 1945-1978, at 3 (2000),
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/030/30-14-1/cmhPub_30-14.pdf.
22. See An Act to establish a Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps for service with the Army of the
United States, Pub. L. No. 77-554, 50 Stat. 278 (1942). MORDEN, supra note 21, at 5.
23. See Exec. Order No. 9163, 7 Fed. Reg. 3695 (May 15, 1942); MORDEN, supra note 21, at 5.
24. See EILEEN PATTEN & KIM PARKER, WOMEN IN THE U.S. MILITARY: GROWING SHARE,
DISTINCTIVE PROFILE 4 (2011),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/12/women-in-the-military.pdf.
25. For substantive review of women’s service, see generally Treadwell, supra note 20; LEISA D.
MEYER, CREATING GI JANE: SEXUALITY AND POWER IN THE WOMEN’S ARMY CORPS DURING WORLD WAR
II (1992).
26. See JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 105 (1994);
MORDEN, supra note 22, at 35.
27. Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80–625, 62 Stat. 356 (1948).
28. See id. This section admittedly glosses over a lengthy history regarding the legislative fights
undertaken regarding how women ought be integrated into the regular fighting force, if at all. For
example, another bill—the WAC Integration Act of 1946—”provided for a separate women’s corps in
the Regular Army whose officer, warrant, and enlisted strength could not exceed 2 percent of the men’s
strength in each equivalent category. Women appointed to the Regular Army could not be permanently
assigned to another branch of the Army.” MORDEN, supra note 21, at 41.
29. OFFICE OF POLICY & PLANNING, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, WOMEN VETERANS: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 4–5 (2007), https://www.va.gov/womenvet/docs/womenvet_history.pdf (citing
HOLM, supra note 24, at 157).
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military.”30 What’s more, “[m]ilitary women were not posted to Southeast Asian
combat zones in significant numbers for almost two years, despite servicewomen’s
requests for deployment to Vietnam and despite the presence of civilian women in
administrative and clerical positions or working with the American Red Cross
and USO [United Service Organization].”31 Notably, the WAC Director, Brigadier
General “Elizabeth Hoisington discouraged sending Army women to Vietnam,
believing that public controversy over the issue of women in combat zones would
deter progress in expanding the role of women in the Army.”32 While strategic, the
diminished role women played in the Vietnam conflict, especially as compared to
their roles in the United States’ three previous large-scale conflicts, could be
viewed as a setback for the military equality movement. The decade was not lost
entirely, however: 1967’s Public Law 90-130 was written and passed “in large part,
to remove statutorily any obstacles to women becoming high ranking military
officers,” kindling the hope of an equal role in the military for women.33
The 1970s were a different story entirely. In 1973, the United States ended the
practice of conscription to fill their ranks and established a volunteer-only
military.34 Subsequently, the government disbanded the WAAC.35 “In 1975, the
Department of Defense ordered the services to discontinue the practice of
discharging women for pregnancy, although the debates about family policy did
not lessen.”36 And “[b]y 1976, one in every 13 recruits was a woman.”37 1976 also
saw the first women begin their attendance at our nation’s prestigious military
academies after the requirement to permit women’s entrance was included in that
year’s defense appropriation bill.38 Simultaneously, military equality was
advanced by judicial rulings. In 1973, the Supreme Court ruled “that the civilian
spouses of military women were to be afforded the same benefits as the civilian
spouses of military men” and ensured that married housing was available at the
same rates, regardless of the sex of the military member.39
Substantial progress happened in the military’s rank and file as well:
Some mark the beginning of the trend toward greater gender equality in the
military with the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973, when
occupational roles within the military opened up considerably for women
because of the need to fill those positions with a volunteer force. That is,

30. 1960s: The Decade, WOMEN’S MEMORIAL, http://www.womensmemorial.org/history/detail/?s=
1960s-the-decade (last accessed Apr. 3, 2017).
31. 1960s: In Vietnam, WOMEN’S MEMORIAL, http://www.womensmemorial.org/history/detail/?s=
1960s-in-vietnam (emphasis added) (last accessed Apr. 3, 2017).
32. Id.
33. OFFICE OF POLICY & PLANNING, supra note 30, at 5–6.
34. See Selective Service Amendment Act of 1969, Public L. No. 91-124, 83 Stat. 220, 220 (1969).
35. See MORDEN, supra note 19, at 395–97.
36. 1970s: The Decade, WOMEN’S MEMORIAL, http://www.womensmemorial.org/history/detail/?s=
1970sthe-decade (last accessed Apr. 3, 2017).
37. Id.
38. See Department of Defense Appropriations Authorization Act, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-106, § 803,
89 Stat. 531, 537 (1975).
39. 1970s: The Decade, supra note 34.

Undue Sacrifice MACRO Final (Do Not Delete)

84 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

1/10/2018 6:40 PM

Volume 25:77 2017

personnel demands could not be met with a force of male volunteers alone.40

This viewpoint is substantiated statistically:
The numbers of women on active duty in the military have risen dramatically
since the beginning of the all-volunteer force. The number serving as enlisted
personnel has grown from 42,278 in 1973 to 166,729 in 2010, and the number
serving as commissioned officers has increased from 12,750 to 35,341 over that
same period. At the same time, the size of the military as a whole has been
declining steadily.41

Military servicewomen made arguably the most significant strides in serving
as equals to their brothers in arms in the past twenty-five years:
The first woman to command a U.S. Navy vessel did so in 1990. In 1991,
women were cleared to fly fighter jets in combat; two years later,
Congress authorized women to serve on combat ships at sea. 1998 marked the
first female fighter pilots to fly combat missions off of an aircraft carrier. The
first women to command a U.S. Navy warship and U.S. Air Force fighter
squadron were given their commands in 1998 and 2004, respectively. By
2010, women were cleared to serve aboard submarines . . . . [And in 2015] we
also saw women soldiers graduate from the Army’s Ranger School.42

The final change referenced, women’s attendance and graduation from
Ranger School, was only made possible because the rule barring women from
combat roles was rescinded. Ranger School—”one of the toughest training courses
for which a Soldier can volunteer”—trains soldiers “in combat arms related
functional skills . . . to engage in close combat and direct-fire battles.”43 Ranger
School was inaccessible to those who could not serve in combat, meaning women
were barred under previous rules.
However, in January 2013, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey rescinded a rule from 1994
that barred women from serving in billets—military parlance for jobs—that would
compel them to “engage in direct combat on the ground.”44 This rescission
required all service branches to formulate a plan for implementation by May 15,
2013 and execute their plans by January 1, 2016.45
By the self-imposed deadline, Secretary Ash Carter, Panetta’s immediate
40. OFFICE OF POLICY & PLANNING, supra note 30, at 7.
41. PATTEN & PARKER, supra note 25, at 4.
42. See Russell Spivak & Adam Aliano, Should Women Register for Selective Service? The Legacy of
Rostker v. Goldberg, LAWFARE (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/should-womenregister-selective-service-legacy-rostker-v-goldberg (citations and quotations omitted).
43. Ranger School, U.S. ARMY, https://www.goarmy.com/soldier-life/being-a-soldier/ongoingtraining/specialized-schools/ranger-school.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
44. Memorandum from Leon Panetta, Sec’y, Dep’t of Def., & General Martin Dempsey, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey to the Chiefs of Mil. Servs. 1 (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://www.defense.gov/news/WISRJointMemo.pdf; Memorandum from Les Aspen, Sec’y, Dep’t of
Def. to the Secretaries of Mil. Servs. and Asst. Sec’ys of Def. 1 (Jan. 13, 1994),
http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/031910d1.pdf.
45. Memorandum from Leon Panetta, Sec’y, Dep’t of Def., & General Martin Dempsey, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey to the Chiefs of Mil. Servs. 1 (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://www.defense.gov/news/WISRJointMemo.pdf.
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successor, executed this policy shift: “Anyone, who can meet operationally
relevant and gender neutral standards, regardless of gender, should have the
opportunity to serve in any position.”46 And since the change, women have
continuously pushed to break the military’s glass ceiling:
For example, Army Capt. Kristen Griest, one of the first women to graduate
the Army’s Ranger School, became the first female infantry officer in history
in April. The same month, “[t]he Army approved requests from 22 women .
. . to enter as 2nd Lieutenants into the Infantry and Armor branches” should
they complete the training requirements. The Marine Corps approved its first
female rifleman and machine gunner in May, and the Army graduated its first
women from Infantry and Armored officer training courses in October and
December, respectively (the latter on the same day as the President
announced his support for female registrants for Selective Service).47

Undoubtedly, however, much progress is yet unrealized. For example, no
woman has served in many of the top military roles in our government, including
the Secretary of Defense, Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and Secretary of the Army.48 We have also never had a female Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, a position traditionally filled by a veteran.49
Yet, measures of equality cannot be limited to titles earned; equality must also
be measured by the sacrifices military servicewomen have shouldered. The
following examples demonstrate the fact that women are increasingly bearing the
costs of war as compared to their historical place as nurses and non-combat service
persons.
“During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm in Iraq and Kuwait, women
played a more prominent role than in previous conflicts.”50 Out of the 147 deaths
suffered by United States service members,51 “[a]pproximately 16 women were
killed during the conflict.”52 What’s more, “two women were taken prisoner.”53
Women’s roles also grew exponentially post-9/11. “An estimated 300,000
women in uniform have served in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.”54
46. Memorandum from Ashton Carter, Sec’y, Dep’t of Def., to the Chiefs of the Military Servs.,
Implementation Guidance for the Full Integration of Women in the Armed Forces 1 (Dec. 3, 2015),
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/OSD014303-15.pdf.
47. See Spivak & Aliano, supra note 43.
48. Though women have served as the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy: Sheilla Widnall and
Deborah James both served as Secretary of the Air Force, while Susan Livingstone served as Secretary
of the Navy, albeit as Acting Secretary.
49. The current Veterans Affairs Secretary, David Shulkin, is the first non-veteran to serve in that
position. See Connor O’Brien, Veterans Affairs secretary confirmed 100-0, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2017),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/veterans-affairs-secretary-confirmed-100-0-234979.
50. KRISTY N. KAMARCK, WOMEN IN COMBAT: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 8 (2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42075.pdf.
51. Fast Facts About Operations Desert Storm/ Desert Shield, Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War
Illnesses, OFFICE SEC’Y DEF., http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/timeline/fast_facts.htm (last accessed Apr. 3,
2017). Notably, this fact sheet claims only 15 women were killed in action (KIA), whereas the CRS
report claims that number is 16. Compare id. with KAMARCK, supra note 51, at 8.
52. KAMARCK, supra note 51, at 8.
53. Id.
54. Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, Opinion, Women in combat? They’ve already been serving on the front
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And though they were barred from serving in combat positions,
[a]s of November 2016, 166 women had lost their lives and 1,033 had been
wounded in action in combat operations since 2003. In addition, in modern
combat operations, over 9,000 women have received Army Combat Action
Badges for “actively engaging or being engaged by the enemy,” and two have
received Silver Stars for “gallantry in action against an enemy of the United
States.”55

Their service is nothing more than paradigmatic. As it relates to the social
change of achieving equality, it demonstrates how far women have come since the
days when they were relegated to serving exclusively as nurses because of
prevailing gender norms. Women’s demonstration that they not only can, but
have, served as genuine equals to their male counterparts in defending their
country furthers the cause of acceptance as equals within the military more
broadly.
II. FRUIT FROM THE POISONOUS TREE: MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT AND
PROSECUTIONS THEREOF56
This section begins by laying out some of the basics of military sexual assault.
Particularly, it addresses three questions to provide the proper context for the rest
of the article’s analysis: 1) How prevalent has sexual assault been historically and how
prevalent is it today?; 2) How are sexual assaults prosecuted in the military justice
system?; and 3) How does the current military justice system fail female victims of
military sexual assault?. We turn first to the statistics.
A. Military Sexual Assault: Current and Historical Statistical Realities
Despite women’s lengthy time in uniform, scant data exists to paint a
comprehensive picture of military sexual assault historically. In fact, according to
the Center for American Progress, “[t]he issue first gained widespread media
attention in 1992 after Paula Coughlin, then a Navy lieutenant, came forward

lines, with heroism, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1204lemmon-women-combat-20151204-story.html.
55. KAMARCK, supra note 51, at 8.
56. It is imperative to point out the military sexual assault perpetrated against women is but one
of the—unfortunately—many fruits of this poisonous tree. Take, for example, the recent and ongoing
scandal involving the publishing of naked photographs of female service members online. See, e.g.,
David Martin, Marines nude photo scandal expands to all branches of military, CBS NEWS (Mar. 9, 2017),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/marines-nude-photo-scandal-expands-to-military-wide-explicitmessage-board/?ftag=CNM-00-10aab6a&linkId=35311723 (outlining the scandal and noting that while
originally believed to be just female Marines, photographs of females serving in all four branches have
been posted online). The act of posting another’s naked photograph without their permission is in itself
illegal, see, e.g., State Revenge Porn Laws, C.A. GOLDBERG, PLLC, http://www.cagoldberglaw.com/stateswith-revenge-porn-laws/ (last updated Mar. 17, 2017) (citing sources), not to mention reprehensible.
But this scandal actually delves deeper: the women whose photographs were taken were often
identified by name and or where they are stationed. See Martin, supra. More, men have been seen on
these message boards posting a non-scandalous photograph of a female soldier soliciting an illicit
counterpart from among the rest of the online community. Id. Degradation of this scale to those who
put their lives on the line is unfathomable and unconscionable.
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about the cover-up of her assault at the 35th Annual Tailhook Symposium the
previous year.”57 The New York Times laid out quite the scene: one officer told the
‘paper of record’ that the conference was “a hot, drunken, messy mass of
humanity.”58 Meanwhile, “some of the Navy’s most elite young officers were
grabbing at female colleagues and civilian women and shoving them down a
gantlet, all the while keeping an eye out for approaching admirals.”59 “[A]fter
more than 1,500 interviews with officers and civilians who attended,” the Navy
“pieced together a rough account that implicated more than 70 officers either in
assaults against at least 26 women, of whom 14 were officers, or in a subsequent
cover-up.”60
“Despite public outrage and a slew of promises by military leaders, very little
meaningful action was taken in the decade that followed . . . [while a] steady
stream of scandals continued to make headlines in the wake of Tailhook.”61 Only
in 2005 did Congress finally take action by establishing the Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Office, or SAPRO, to combat sexual assault in the
military.62 Yet according to the GAO’s Director of Defense Capabilities and
Management, as recently as September 2008 SAPRO was “not able to conduct
comprehensive cross-service trend analysis of sexual assault incidents.”63
The intervening years have not been without their problems. The Lackland
Air Force Basic Training Scandal saw “62 trainees identified as victims of assault
or other improper conduct by 32 training instructors between 2009 and 2012 at
Lackland, a sprawling base outside San Antonio that serves as the Air Force’s basic
training center for enlisted personnel.”64 The scandal ended the careers of not only
those convicted of the crimes, but also of the superiors along the chain of
command.65
57. ROSENTHAL & KORB, supra note 9, at 7 (citing Michael Winerip, Revisiting the Military’s Tailhook
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/booming/revisiting-themilitarys-tailhook-scandal-video.html?_r=0).
58. Eric Schmitt, Wall of Silence Impedes Inquiry Into a Rowdy Navy Convention, N.Y. TIMES (June 14,
1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/14/us/wall-of-silence-impedes-inquiry-into-a-rowdy-navyconvention.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. ROSENTHAL & KORB, supra note 9, at 7.
62. Id.
63. Sexual Assault in the Military—Part II: Hearing before the Subcomm. on National Security and
Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 75 (2008) (statement of
Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability
Office), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/fdlp1555/pt2.pdf. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL: DOD’S AND THE COAST GUARD’S SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE PROGRAMS FACE IMPLEMENTATION AND OVERSIGHT CHALLENGES, REPORT NO. GAO-08-924
(2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08924.pdf (“[A]s of July 2008, the task force had not yet begun
its review.”).
64. James Risen, Attacked at 19 by an Air Force Trainer, and Speaking Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013,
at A1.
65. See Larry Shaughnessy, Sex scandal ends Air Force colonel’s career, CNN (Aug. 10, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/10/us/military-sex-misconduct; Bryant Jordan, AF Commander Fired Amid
Squadron Sex Scandal, MILITARY TIMES (Jun 22, 2012), http://www.military.com/dailynews/2012/06/22/af-commander-fired-amid-squadron-sex-scandal.html.
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Today, the statistics are not much better. The most recent Pentagon study on
military sexual assault was released in May of 2016.66 The study “found that a total
of 6,083 reports of sexual assault involving military service members were
received during the year, 48 lower than the 6,131 in 2014.”67 In other words, 4.3%
of servicewomen are victims of sexual assault. Yet, the lower raw numbers are not
so much a sign of encouragement as a sign of external factors: “while the number
of reports has decreased, so has the size of [the] military, meaning that
proportionally the rates are the same.”68
The likelihood of sexual assault is even worse for those in more extreme
situations: “Some 48.6% said they had been sexually harassed during their time in
a war zone. Sexual assaults during deployment, up to and including rape, were
reported by 22.8% of women.”69 Rape is horrible, regardless of whether someone
is serving on front lines or not, but there is a cruel irony that those who are at the
highest risk of loss of life or limb are simultaneously at the highest risk of unwanted
sexual contact.
Then comes the question of reporting, discussed in greater detail infra. Of
these thousands of incidents, the numerical realities of those who actually choose
to pursue legal action is staggering. Only 657 total formal complaints were filed,
315 of which were substantiated.70 And yet, only 19—or 7%—resulted in courts
martial, discharge, or both.71
B. The National Security Implications of Pervasive Sexual Assault
Those that would dismiss this problem as a secondary concern do not
understand its ramifications: not addressing sexual assaults has severe national
security implications.
[S]exual assault has a uniquely greater damaging effect on the military, such
that even one incident is unacceptable. Incidents of sexual assault are
detrimental to morale, destroy unit cohesion, show disrespect for the chain of
command, and damage the military as a whole, both internally as well as
externally.

66. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2015
ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY FACT SHEET (May 2016),
http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY15_Annual/FY15_Annual_Report_Fact_Sheet.pdf [hereinafter
2015 FACT SHEET].
67. Jessica Sarhan, Pentagon: Sexual assault cases in the military remain constant, CNN (May 5, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/05/politics/pentagon-sexual-assault-annual-report (citing 2015 FACT
SHEET).
68. Id. Notably, the levels of sexual assault perpetrated against women vary across the different
branches. See Brendan McGarry, Study: Female Marines, Sailors at Higher Risk of Sexual Assault, MILITARY
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/12/04/study-female-marines-sailors-athigher-risk-of-sexual-assault.html.
69. Gregg Zoroya, VA finds sexual assaults more common in war zones, USA TODAY (Dec. 26, 2012),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/26/va-finds-sexual-assaults-more-common-inwar-zones/1793253/.
70. 2015 FACT SHEET, supra note 67.
71. Id.
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Service members are trained for situations in which it is essential to trust both
enlisted members of the unit and the chain of command completely. Sexual
assault in the military destroys that trust, which can detract from the readiness
of America’s armed forces.72

Said another way by Gen. Ray Odierno, former Chief of Staff of the United
States Army, “Our profession is built on a bedrock of trust—the trust must
inherently exist among soldiers, and between soldiers and their leaders to
accomplish their mission in the chaos of war. Recent incidents of sexual assault
and sexual harassment demonstrate that we have violated that trust.”73 Losing that
faith can “do real harm to the military by discouraging young women from joining
the armed forces and convincing those already in uniform to get out.”74
Secondarily, “the drain on military resources because of the Pentagon’s
failure to deal with this problem is staggering. . . . [I]n 2010 alone, the VA spent
about $872 million on sexual assault-related health care expenditures.”75 As
healthcare costs continue to rise, these costs will only continue to bloat the defense
budget. This is not to say that we should not address the issue because it’s costprohibitive. To the contrary, we ought to address it immediately, as a failure to do
so will accumulate millions in the defense budget.
It is beyond contestation that sexual assault in the military undermines our
national security. But recognizing the problem’s prevalence and its national
security implications is not enough; it is necessary to understand how sexual
assaults are dealt with ex post facto.
C. Prosecuting Sexual Assaults in the Military Justice System
This subsection reviews both the framework and practical process of
prosecuting sexual assaults in the military justice system.

72. CHARLES STIMSON, SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY: UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM AND
HOW TO FIX IT (2013), http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/sexual-assault-the-militaryunderstanding-the-problem-and-how-fix-it. Notably, Stimson was just nominated to the Senate Armed
Services Committee by the Navy’s general counsel. See Joe Gould, White House advances Navy secretary,
NEWS
(June
7,
2017),
two
other
DoD
picks
to
Senate,
DEFENSE
http://www.defensenews.com/congress/2017/06/07/white-house-advances-navy-secretary-two-otherdod-picks-to-senate.
73. Pending Legislation Regarding Sexual Assaults in the Military: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Armed Services, 113th Cong. 12 (2013) (statement of Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, USA, Chief of Staff of
the Army), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/pendinglegislation_sexualassaults
inmilitary_fullcomm_hearing_060413.pdf.
74. Martin, supra note 57.
75. ROSENTHAL & KORB, supra note 9, at 11 (citing Service Women’s Action Network, “Rape,
Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment in the Military,” available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/
SWAN_Rape-SA-and-Sexual-Harassment-in-the-Military-the-Quick-Facts_4-2012.pdf).
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1. A Parallel Universe: The Existence and Provisions of the Military Justice
System
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger[.]76

Under Article 1, Section 8, “Congress shall have Power To ... make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces[.]” The power is
manifested in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),77 the comprehensive
set of laws governing the U.S. armed forces. Constitutional protections still bear
on service members, providing a floor for their protections: indeed “our citizens
in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed
their civilian clothes.”78
But such protections are only a floor. Upon enlisting, individuals have
contracted their right to be subject to a separate court system.79
The Supreme Court, for more than a century, has acknowledged that while
the soldier is also a citizen, the military, as a “specialized community
governed by a separate discipline,” may regulate or permit service members’
conduct in ways which would be constitutionally impermissible in civilian
society.80

Simply having two different systems is not inherently wrong—or rather it is
not inherently susceptible to patriarchal supremacy and the implicit subjugation
of women. That problem manifests itself in the distinct incentives of the different
structures. As a member of the military’s legal arm notes:
Unlike its domestic counterpart, whose raison d’être is to dispense justice, the
purpose of the military’s system of justice “is to promote justice, to assist in
maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote
efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to
strengthen the national security of the United States.”81

76. U.S. CONST. amd. V.
77. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946, 64 Stat. 109 (2012).
78. Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962).
79. An enlistment contract states outright: “My enlistment/reenlistment agreement is more than
an employment agreement. It effects a change in status from civilian to military member of the Armed
Forces. As a member of the Armed Forces of the United States, I will be: . . . Subject to the military
justice system, which means, among other things, that I may be tried by military courts-martial.” Dep’t
of Defense, DD Form 4/3 (2007), http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/forms/dd/dd0004.
pdf.
80. Michael F. Noone, Chimera or Jackalope? Department of Defense Efforts to Apply Civilian Sexual
Harassment Criteria to the Military, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 151, 152 (1999) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953)).
81. Dana Michael Hollywood, Creating A True Army of One: Four Proposals to Combat Sexual
Harassment in Today’s Army, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 177 (2007) (quoting MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL pt. I, Preamble (2005 ed.)).
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After a checkered past,82 the UCMJ finally adopted definitions of—and thus
criminalized—rape, sexual assault, aggravated sexual contact, and abusive sexual
contact in line with civilian criminal statutes.83 But the statutes are not the only
things distinct from the civilian world: the mechanics of how a military prosecutor
charges a perpetrator with one of these offenses is different, and demonstrates
where the disparate treatment originates.
2. Venturing Down the Rabbit Hole: The Mechanics of Charging Sexual
Assault in the Military Court System
The charging process for a court-martial is not dissimilar to its civilian
analogues: preliminary hearings in the civil setting and grand juries in the criminal
setting.84

82. See Lisa M. Schenck, Sex Offenses Under Military Law: Will the Recent Changes in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice Re-Traumatize Sexual Assault Survivors in the Courtroom?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
439, 441–43 (2014). The original UCMJ defined rape as: “Any person subject to this chapter who
commits an act of sexual intercourse by force and without consent, is guilty of rape and shall be
punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.” Act of 5 May 1950, ch. 169
§1 (Art. 120), 64 Stat. 108, 140 (1950). This definition “became widely criticized as antiquated.” Schenck,
supra, at 442 (“[B]ecause ‘force’ lacks ‘obvious or plain’ meaning, the statutory scheme focused attention
on the victim’s conduct as opposed to the accused’s conduct, and culpability-based gradations of
conduct and punishment are more effective in deterring crime. ‘The requirement that a woman resist
her assailant grew out of the law’s suspicion of the credibility of unchaste or vengeful women.’ As
views of women’s place in society changed, however, the law eventually followed.” (internal citations
omitted)). See also United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2005). Congress demanded the
Secretary of Defense “propose changes to the existing sex offenses in the UCMJ, ‘to conform . . . more
closely to other [f]ederal laws and regulations that address [sexual assault].’” Schenck, supra, at 443
quoting Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108375, 118 Stat. 1811, 1920 (2004). Though the “Joint Service Committee [JSC] provided an 826-page report
focused on statutory changes to assist Congress in bringing the UCMJ up to date,” Schenck, supra, at
442, the subcommittee “unanimously concluded that change is not required” because it believed no
illegal actions were beyond prosecution under the definition. MARK HARVEY, SEX CRIMES AND THE
UCMJ: A REPORT FOR THE JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE 1 (Feb. 2005),
http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/03_Topic-Areas/02Article_120/20150116/58_Report_SexCrimes_UCMJ.pdf. Nevertheless, Congress would enact one of
the options suggested by the report. Id.
83. 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2012).
84. DEP’T OF LAW, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY AT WEST POINT, BALANCING ORDER AND JUSTICE: THE
COURT-MARTIAL PROCESS 5 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
litigation/materials/sac_2012/01-1_court_martial_process.authcheckdam.pdf.
The Article 32 investigation has often been compared to both the civilian preliminary
hearing and the civilian grand jury since it is functionally similar to both. All three of
these proceedings are theoretically similar in that each is concerned with determining
whether there is sufficient probable cause (reasonable grounds) to believe a crime was
committed and whether the person accused of the crime committed it. The Article 32
investigation, however, is broader in scope and more protective of the accused.
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For example, there is a defined procedure, specific rules of evidence, and each
side has the right to an attorney: a party will be provided a military lawyer, called
a JA or JAG in military parlance,85 but is also permitted to hire a civilian lawyer.86
Once an attack is alleged, the victim can report it with the hope of prosecuting
her attacker (“an unrestricted report”) or do so only with the aim of receiving
medical support (“a restricted report”) and subsequent benefits.87 If she chooses
the former, she must go to a superior in her chain of command to detail it.88 “After
a preliminary inquiry and consideration of administrative, nonpunitive[sic] and
nonjudicial[sic] actions, the unit commander may determine that the matter is
sufficiently serious to warrant trial by court-martial.”89
UCMJ Article 32 “requires a thorough and impartial investigation of charges
and specifications before they may be referred to a general court-martial (the most
serious level of courts-martial).”90 The commanding officer will detail another
commissioned officer to investigate and schedule an investigative hearing as soon
as reasonably practicable.91 This hearing is reminiscent of a miniature trial, but
there are some important differences: the investigating officer reviews all nontestimonial evidence and examines witnesses, though the majority of the rules of
evidence do not apply.92 “Upon completion of the hearing, the investigating officer
submits a written report of the investigation to the commander who directed the
investigation,” which essentially recaps the evidence and the investigating
officer’s conclusions about the nature and merits of the charges.93 Once the defense

85. This is short for Judge Advocate General. The lead lawyer for each branch of the military is
The Judge Advocate General, and all subordinates are technically members of the JAG Corps, but the
lawyers are nevertheless referred to as JAGs. Interestingly, the term Judge Advocate was originally
reserved for an individual appointed to prosecute a court martial, “neither a judge nor a trained
advocate.” C. Peter Dungan, Avoiding “Catch-22s”: Approaches to Resolve Conflicts Between Military and
State Bar Rules of Professional Responsibility, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 31 (2006) (citing WILLIAM WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 179 (1920)). In fact, the judge advocate was not required to have any
formal training. See Winthrop, supra, at 179.
86. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES § 506 (2012 ed.) [hereinafter MANUAL].
87. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 18 (2013),
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/09242013_Statutory_Enforcement_Report_Sexual_Assault_in_the_Militar
y.pdf. She may also choose to report it while not seeking to charge her attacker, too.
88. The chain-of-command requirement is problematic. See infra Section III.D.1. Prosecutorial
Authority and Discretion.
89. DEP’T OF LAW, supra note 6, at 1. Notably, “Battery/Company commanders [officers with
typically under 6 years of experience in charge of anywhere from 100 to 200 soldiers] normally cannot
convene courts-martial. They may only recommend trial and forward the entire case file up the chain
of command. Each subsequent higher commander must exercise personal discretion in disposing or
recommending disposition of the case.” Id.
90. Id. at 2. This provision is necessary for principles of due process because “[t]he Fifth
Amendment constitutional right to grand jury indictment is expressly inapplicable to the Armed
Forces.” Id.
91. Id. at 3–5.
92. Id. at 4. (“The investigating officer will, generally, review all non-testimonial evidence and
then proceed to examination of witnesses. Except for a limited set of rules on privileges, interrogation,
and the rape-shield rule, the military rules of evidence (which are similar to the federal rules of
evidence) do not apply at this investigative hearing.”).
93. Id. at 5.
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council and the accused have a copy of the report, the convening authority again
confers with the SJA office before deciding whether charges ought to be pressed.94
Once the decision has been made to prosecute, the procedures follow the
Manual for Courts-Martial, which sets out a trial much like any civilian analog.
D. How Does the Current Military Justice System Fail Female Victims of
Military Sexual Assault?
Several factors contribute to the military justice system’s failure of female
victims of military sexual assault: a convening authority’s prosecutorial discretion,
the improper chain of command influence, manipulative jury practices, retributive
practices after reporting, and insufficient civilian redress. This sub-section
explains each in turn.
1. Prosecutorial Authority and Discretion
The civilian justice system serves only one mistress: lady justice. In the oftrepeated words of Chief Justice John Marshall, “[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”95 On the other hand,
the military justice system is susceptible to dueling muses: justice and discipline.
The Manual for Courts-Martial concedes this much:
The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good
order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and
effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the
national security of the United States.96

Being the servant of two mistresses has dubious implications. For example,
what if a high-ranking commander deployed in a war zone and facing combat
daily hears a generally inept female soldier credibly claim that the commander’s
deputy and an otherwise outstanding officer sexually assaulted her. The
commanding officer has all the evidence he needs to convict the deputy, but also
knows that the effectiveness of his unit—and thus the lives and wellbeing of all
others in his command—will likely be jeopardized without one of the most
important figureheads of the battalion. In no way should a commander forego
justice for the victim, but the rules permit such an action: though the staff judge
advocate will tender advice and recommendations on the charge,97 “the final
decision” of whether to prosecute remains in the commander’s hands.98
Consider the incentives of the commanding officer. He or she also receives
fitness reports that dictate career trajectory. Certainly it looks awful when a

94. Id. at 6.
95. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
96. MANUAL, supra note 8, at I-1. “This bifurcated approach contemplates strengthening the
national security of the United States by maintaining good order and discipline in the ranks.” Mitsie
Smith, Comment, Adding Force Behind Military Sexual Assault Reform: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion
in Ending Intra-Military Sexual Assault, 19 BUFF. J. GENDER, L. & SOC. POL’Y 147, 160 (2011).
97. 10 U.S.C. §834 (2012).
98. Lorelei Laird, Military lawyers confront changes as sexual assault becomes big news, AM. BAR
ASSOC. J. (Sep. 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/military_lawyers_confront_
changes_as_sexual_assault_becomes_big_news.
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candidate competing for a promotion has the black mark of a convicted sexual
assault in his or her unit: it can project negative leadership in myriad ways. Thus,
commanding officers have their own incentives to bury these indiscretions.
This cruel tempting of fate has another dimension to it: the victim can—and
unfortunately has—been prosecuted simply because bringing forward the claim
disrupts the unit, thereby “prejudic[ing] good order and discipline” in violation of
UCMJ Article 134.99 Silencing dissention by prosecuting those who name their
attackers metes out perverse injustices.
There is yet another element of unjust command influence that bears upon
the discussion of military sexual assault: vociferously advocating its demise has
been interpreted as undue influence in favor of conviction. In 2015, the military
appeals court judge found that “counsel’s multiple improper references to Armywide efforts to respond to and prevent sexual assault . . . were a source of an unfair
trial,” and that such unfairness prejudiced the trial “because the panel may have
been swayed by the constitutionally impermissible derogations contained in
government counsel’s arguments.”100
This line of thinking is not new. It in fact mirrors the Executive’s efforts to
combat sexual assault in the military. As one report states:
This issue would not exist, but for the repeated public statements by senior
Army officials, and other government officials, about the need to eradicate
sexual assault from the military. It is this means of improper influence that is
so difficult to remove from a military trial, even with a military judge
vigilantly policing the arguments of the prosecutor.101

99. See Dorothy J. Samuels, The Military’s Hail Mary, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE (Oct. 14, 2013, 4:38
PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/the-militarys-hail-mary/?_r=0 (citing Article 134,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012).
100. United States v. Garcia, ARMY 20130660, 2015 WL 4940266, at *10 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 18,
2015)).
101. See James Joyner & James W. Weirick, Sexual Assault in the Military and the Unlawful Command
Influence Catch-22, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Oct. 7, 2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/10/sexualassault-in-the-military-and-the-unlawful-command-influence-catch-22/. This reports states, for
example:
In order to address the burgeoning issue of sexual assault in the ranks and combat the
perception that dealing with it was not a priority, President Obama, service secretaries,
service chiefs, and commanders down to the lowest levels mounted an aggressive
campaign to highlight the severity of the issue to service members. Thousands of
speeches were given and extensive training was instituted. This very campaign was
found to constitute “unlawful command influence[.]”
The recent spate of unlawful command influence rulings began with a Navy judge’s
finding that President Obama’s comments about sexual assault unduly influenced any
potential sentencing.
[In another case], the military judge ruled that unlawful command influence had
tainted the trial. Former Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. James Amos, was also
found to have exercised unlawful command influence when he commenced on a
worldwide speaking tour addressing the Corps about the problem of sexual assault.
His actions resulted in a military court of appeals overturning a conviction for sexual
assault. [Another] opinion noted that “with multiple references — some overt and
others thinly veiled — to the Army’s efforts to confront sexual assault, the government
attempted to impermissibly influence the panel’s findings by injecting command policy
into the trial.” In the Garcia case, the prosecutor repeatedly, and improperly, mentioned
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Military appeals courts that ascribe to this thinking are unable to separate the
politicking and policy-promoting for genuine influence. But “Commander-inchief is only one of many hats the president wears and declining to speak out in
the face of public perception that sexual assault is rampant in our armed forces
would be unthinkable.”102 Instead the military appeals courts seem to be offering
women a catch-22: damned if their leaders care, and damned if they don’t. This
line of thinking only further perpetuates the male-male alliances that enable these
actions.
Nevertheless, these rulings should not deter voicing change: while both
terrible and nuanced, these are short-term costs to long-term solutions,
overcorrections on the pendulum of justice that will diminish proportionally to the
mitigation of sexual assault. In short, perfection should not be the enemy of good.
2. A Jury of Peers?
There are many ways in which the jury of a sexual assault case in a court
martial favors the defendants. In the courts-martial system, the convening
authority initially assigns nine jurors, called panel members.103 Thereafter, there is
a typical voir dire process, in which either party can strike for cause and each party
has one peremptory challenge. As the American Bar Association states outright,
The use of the peremptory challenge by the defense could be used to gain a
slight mathematical advantage. For example, with nine members on the panel,
the prosecution needs six votes for conviction. If the defense strikes a member,
leaving eight members, the prosecution still needs six votes to convict because
two-thirds of eight is slightly more than five.104

But even beyond the numerical manipulation, there are more human factors
at work. In a court-martial, panel members are themselves members of the
military. This is important because of the military’s gender demographics. As of
January 2017, women comprise 17.36% of the officer corps and 16.01% of all
soldiers across the Department of Defense, as enlisted soldiers are 15.63%
female.105 (This effect is slightly more profound when the accused is an enlisted
soldier: when an officer is being court-martialed, all panel members are officers,
whereas when an enlisted soldier is on trial, he may request enlisted soldiers be
empaneled.106) Therefore, when a man is on trial for sexually assaulting a female,
he is exceedingly likely to be judged by his brethren, who have their own incentives
to protect the patriarchy via their male-male alliances.
Moreover, when in a civilian jury, while there is a foreperson, there is no
distinct hierarchy. Yet when empaneled, members are not stripped of rank;
the Army’s stance on sexual assaults. The military judge failed to provide the proper
limiting instructions to the jury, i.e., to ignore the prosecutor’s repeated references to
the Army’s stance on the problem of sexual assault.
102. Id.
103. MANUAL, supra note 8, § 501.
104. DEP’T OF LAW, supra note 6, at 10.
105. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL BY RANK/GRADE: JANUARY 31, 2017,
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName=rg1701.pdf&groupName=milRankGr
ade.
106. 10 U.S.C. § 825 (2012).
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everyone remains aware of their rank and the rank of their colleagues. As men are
more represented at the highest rank, they likely influence the panel. If even from
a subconscious bias, they could inadvertently favor a male defendant who
allegedly attacked a female victim. Especially when facing the male-male alliance
within the deliberation and aware of the retaliation forces at work, there is
certainly reason to believe that a female panel member—statistically only one will
be detailed to the panel—would be wary of speaking up.
3. Retribution and Retaliation
Arguably scarier than having to reimagine this trauma without vindication—
and with the knowledge that none is imminent—there is a very real possibility
that victims will be retaliated against. The problems associated with retaliation are
endless.
To start, the Defense Department has had some trouble getting its own house
in order. Despite the prevalence of the problems for years, the April 2016
Department of Defense Retaliation Prevention and Response Strategy Regarding
Sexual Assault and Harassment Reports confirms that “the current definitions
vary across the Services and lack consistency and clarity in approach.”107
Thankfully, this problem can largely be considered cured now. Upon passing the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which included the Military Justice
Improvement Act,108 the NDAA explicitly made retaliation a punishable offense
(for the first time) and included a definition: the UCMJ defines retaliation as when
someone,
with the intent to retaliate against any person for reporting or planning to
report a criminal offense, or making or planning to make a protected
communication, or with the intent to discourage any person from reporting a
criminal offense or making or planning to make a protected communication
(1) wrongfully takes or threatens to take an adverse personnel action against
any person; or (2) wrongfully withholds or threatens to withhold a favorable
personnel action with respect to any person.109

Then, just like with sexual assault itself, there are problems with retaliation
both in its pervasiveness and in individuals’ fear of reporting it. First, the
pervasiveness: In 2014, “[o]f the 4.3% of [all service women] who indicated
experiencing unwanted sexual contact in the past year and who reported the
matter to a military authority or organization, 62% perceived some form of
[retaliation].”110 This number unfortunately “has not changed significantly” from

107. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD RETALIATION PREVENTION AND RESPONSE STRATEGY: REGARDING
SEXUAL ASSAULT AND HARASSMENT REPORTS 5 (Apr. 2016), http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/
retaliation/DoD_Retaliation_Strategy.pdf.
108. See infra notes 196–200 and accompanying text.
109. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328 (2016).
110. SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFFICE, DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR 2014, 10 (2015),
http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY14_Annual/DoD_FY14_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assa
ult_in_the_Military.pdf (citing 2 SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE MILITARY, at xviii
(Andrew
R.
Morral,
Kriste
L.
Gore
&
Terry
L.
Schell
eds.,
2014),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR870z2-1.html).
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2012.111 As Human Rights Watch states, “military service members who reported
sexual assault were 12 times more likely to suffer retaliation for doing so than to
see their offender, if also a service member, convicted for a sex offense.”112
Simultaneously, “the majority of individuals who perceive retaliation
associated with these forms of misconduct do not officially report their
allegations.”113 The reasoning behind that reticence makes sense: the consequences
outweigh the benefits. Personal retribution ranged from being “[a]ssailed with
obscenities and insults” to being “[t]hreatened with death by ‘friendly fire.’”114 The
professional consequences are just as apparent and harmful, with retaliation in the
form of demotions, poor performance reviews, severe penalties for minor
infractions, and outright bans on promotions.115
It is therefore no surprise that “[m]any survivors . . . considered the aftermath
of the sexual assault—bullying and isolation from peers or the damage done to
their career as a result of reporting—worse than the assault itself. Survivors . . . felt
they were viewed as ‘troublemakers’ who brought negative attention to their
unit.”116 What’s more, the retaliation can come from many sources. From
commanders assigning useless and undignified busy work to receiving outright
physically abusive hazing from colleagues, victims who report their crime—and
bring alleged “shame” to their unit—are vulnerable to retribution by all
surrounding parties.117 Under such conditions, no one can blame survivors for
choosing to forego reporting.
4. Insufficient Federal Legal Redress
Given the fraught—and apparently likely fruitless—process of seeking to
obtain vindication in military courts, it is important to examine how sexual assault
victims in the military can seek redress outside of the UCMJ framework.
Unfortunately, obtaining such remedies is made nearly impossible due to several
impediments, which this sub-section explicates. Particularly thorny among them
are the Feres doctrine, the political question doctrine, the exhaustion doctrine, and
standing.

111. 2 SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE MILITARY 69 (Andrew R. Morral, Kriste
L. Gore & Terry L. Schell eds., 2014), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR870z2-1.html.
112. SARA DAREHSHORI & MEGHAN RHOAD, EMBATTLED: RETALIATION AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT
SURVIVORS IN THE US MILITARY 3 (2015), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/
us0515militaryweb.pdf.
113. SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFFICE, DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR 2015, 40 (2016),
http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY15_Annual/FY15_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault_in_the_
Military.pdf.
114. DAREHSHORI & RHOAD, supra note 114, at 3. This report catalogues an extraordinarily yet
incomplete range of retributive actions.
115. See generally DAREHSHORI & RHOAD, supra note 114.
116. Id. at 5–6.
117. See generally id.
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a. The Feres Doctrine
The largest obstacle to civil remedy is the Feres doctrine.118 In Feres v. United
States,119 the Supreme Court took up and combined three causes of action filed by
the executrixes of estates of three United States servicemen suing the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for injuries arising out of or in the
course of activity incident to military service.120 The Court interpreted the FTCA
to open the government up to “liability under circumstances that would bring
private liability into existence.”121 What’s more, lacking historical precedent for
laws permitting soldiers to sue the government,122 the Court “conclude[d] that the
Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover money
damages for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service.”123 Some thirty years later, “the U.S. Supreme
Court extended Feres to ‘Bivens-type claims.’”124
Now, “[t]he Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules; each
case must be examined in light of the statute as it has been construed in Feres and
subsequent cases.”125 Therefore, each court must assess the unique and particular
facts of a matter, as “[w]hether Feres applies to a particular claim turns on whether
the injury arose incident to military service.”126 That determination has historically
been a multi-factor case-by-case adjudication. Among these factors,
no single one [is] dispositive. Important factors in resolving whether an injury

118. Dana Michael Hollywood, a member of the Judge Advocate General Corps, exhaustively
details the history of the Feres doctrine in Creating A True Army of One: Four Proposals to Combat Sexual
Harassment in Today’s Army, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 185–92 (2007). Her article was instrumental
in the formation of this sub-section.
119. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
120. Id. at 136–38.
121. Id. at 141.
122. Id. at 141–42 (“We know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for
negligence, against either his superior officers or the Government he is serving. Nor is there any
liability ‘under like circumstances,’ for no private individual has power to conscript or mobilize a
private army with such authorities over persons as the Government vests in echelons of command. The
nearest parallel, even if we were to treat ‘private individual’ as including a state, would be the
relationship between the states and their militia. But if we indulge plaintiffs the benefit of this
comparison, claimants cite us no state, and we know of none, which has permitted members of its
militia to maintain tort actions for injuries suffered in the service, and in at least one state the contrary
has been held to be the case.”).
123. 340 U.S. at 146.
124. Doe v. Hagenbeck, 98 F Supp. 3d 672, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296, 304 (1983)). A Bivens claim, named for Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), stands for the principle that an individual has a private right of action
for money damages against federal agents for a violation of the individual’s constitutional right. Id. at
395–397.
125. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
126. Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL &
INS. PRAC. L.J. 1105, 1116 (2009). The Feres Doctrine has also been applied in rare cases when “the type
of claim[] that, if generally permitted [under the FTCA], would involve the judiciary in sensitive
military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness.” Id. at 1116 n.81 (citing Shearer,
473 U.S. at 59 (1985)).
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arose incident to service include the following: whether the injury arose while
a service member was on active duty; whether the injury arose on a military
situs; whether the injury arose during a military activity; whether the service
member was taking advantage of a privilege or enjoying a benefit conferred
as a result of military service when the injury arose; and whether the injury
arose while the service member was subject to military discipline or control.127

But because no factor is determinative, courts have preferred to look
holistically at the “totality of the circumstances.”128 Notably, “numerous circuits
have found that individuals on reserve status fall within the Feres bar.”129
The examples of cases that have been brought before federal courts and
barred from adjudication on the merits because of the Feres doctrine are
staggering. The Feres doctrine barred an Army sergeant from seeking damages for
being swindled into “volunteering” to test the effects of LSD without his knowing
consent.130 In another example, the Supreme Court held that:
a widow could not sue for the death of her husband in a barracks fire resulting
from the negligent maintenance of a heating system. Similarly, the Court held
that a widow could not sue for the death of her husband in a Coast Guard
helicopter crash where the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had taken
control of the helicopter’s radar. The executor of a sailor’s estate could not sue
for the sailor’s death from falling off a pier on return to his ship, and an offduty marine could not sue for injuries received when he was run over on base
by an on-duty military policeman. The estates of sailors who drowned while
participating in a Navy-led rafting trip also were barred from suing, as was
the mother of an off-duty soldier who was murdered by a fellow soldier.131

But as it relates to this essay, the Feres doctrine has a heinous legacy in
preventing the vast majority of sexual assault victims from having their day in
127. Id. at 1116–17 (footnotes omitted). These tests are also slightly varied depending on the
jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has laid out particular four particular foci: “(1) the place
where the negligent act occurred; (2) the duty status of the plaintiff when the negligent act occurred;
(3) the benefits accruing to the plaintiff because of his status as a service member; and (4) the nature of
the plaintiff’s activities at the time the negligent act occurred.” Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 867
(9th Cir. 2001).
128. Millang v. United States, 817 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1987).
129. Wake v. United States, 89 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Quintana v. United States, 997 F.2d
711, 712 (10th Cir.1993) (rejecting argument that “the Feres doctrine does not bar [plaintiff’s] claim
because she was on reserve status, rather than active duty status”); Duffy v. United States, 966 F.2d
307, 312 (7th Cir.1992) (“status as a reservist . . . unquestionably is a military status”); Norris v. Lehman,
845 F.2d 283, 286–287 (11th Cir.1988) (per curiam); Estate of Martinelli v. United States Department of
the Army, 812 F.2d 872, 873 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822, 108 S.Ct. 82 (1987) (reservist’s
military status barred FTCA claim for injuries sustained during weekend drill); Mattos v. United States,
412 F.2d 793, 794 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Carroll, 369 F.2d 618, 620 (8th Cir.
1966) (“There is no doubt that the Feres decision applies also to reservists.”)). See also Doe, 98 F. Supp.
3d at 686 (citing Collins v. United States, 642 F.2d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1981) (FTCA suit by cadet at Air
Force Academy for medical malpractice dismissed because under Feres injuries occurred “incident to
service”); Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2013) (suits for sexual assault incurred while on
active duty in the military dismissed); Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369 (D.C.Cir. 2014) (same)).
130. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
131. Melissa Feldmeier, Comment, At War with the Feres Doctrine: The Carmelo Rodriguez Military
Medical Accountability Act of 2009, 60 CATH. U.L. REV. 145, 147 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
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federal court,132 even as courts go out of their way to “emphasize that [barring]
suit . . . by the Feres doctrine in no way suggests that we minimize the seriousness
of the alleged misconduct.”133 (The Feres doctrine also has an equally horrific
legacy in barring negligence claims for what would otherwise amount to medical
malpractice.134)
Importantly, the actual Feres doctrine and nearly all of its progeny only
restrict the collection of money damages. But, as spelled out earlier, because many
victims only come forward after they leave the military or are reassigned to new
posts to guard against retaliation and career stagnation, it would logically follow
that plaintiffs would prefer to pursue money damages. Moreover, for the many
that have left the military as a result of their treatment, they may see pursuing an
injunction against practices that would no longer impact them personally
insufficiently compensatory.135 (No such cross-sectional studies of what military
sexual assault victims most typically pursue have been performed to my
knowledge.)
And when courts “find that [they] do not have jurisdiction under Feres,” they
often forego discussions of other issues, such as the political question doctrine, the
exhaustion doctrine, and standing.136 However, in cases where Feres would not
apply—namely actions seeking injunction—the judiciary’s arsenal of tools stands
at the ready to block such claims.

132. See, e.g., Mackey v. Milam, 154 F.3d 648, 649–50 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035
(1999); Gonzalez v U.S. Air Force, 88 Fed. Appx. 371, 375 (10th Cir. 2004); Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d
505 (4th Cir. 2013); Stubbs v. United States, 744 F.2d 58, 60-61 (8th Cir. 1984) (concluding
that Feres barred a claim against the United States for a service member’s suicide allegedly caused by
her drill sergeant’s sexual harassment and assault); Matreale v. New Jersey Dep’t of Military &
Veterans Affairs, 487 F.3d 150, 152–54 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a FTCA claim that superiors
retaliated against the plaintiff for supporting a sexual assault claim by a fellow soldier was barred
by Feres); Mackey v. United States, 226 F.3d 773, 774–77 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that a FTCA claim that
superior officers sexually harassed the plaintiff was barred by Feres); Smith v. United States, 196 F.3d
774, 776–78 (7th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a FTCA claim that superiors negligently supervised a
sergeant who allegedly raped the plaintiff was barred by Feres); Davis v. Marsh, 876 F.2d 1446, 1450
(9th Cir. 1989) (finding that a Bivens claim alleging sexual harassment by superior officers was barred
by Chappell, which itself relies on Feres); Dexheimer v. United States, 608 F.2d 765, 767 (9th Cir. 1979);
Bartley v. Dep’t of the Army, 221 F.Supp.2d 934, 936, 948–49, 955–56 (C.D.Ill. 2002) (holding that FTCA
and Bivens claims that superiors sexually assaulted and harassed the plaintiffs were barred
by Feres and Chappell); Morse v. West, 975 F.Supp. 1379, 1380–82 (D.Colo. 1997) (holding that FTCA
and Bivens claims alleging sexual harassment by ROTC personnel were barred by Feres); Klay v.
Panetta, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8, 24 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 758 F3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Perez v. Puerto Rico Nat.
Guard, 951 F. Supp. 2d 279, 296 (D.P.R. 2013); see also Ann-Marie Woods, Note, A “More Searching
Judicial Inquiry”: The Justiciability of Intra-Military Sexual Assault Claims, 55 B.C.L. REV. 1329, 1366 n.89
(2014); Francine Banner, Immoral Waiver: Judicial Review of lntra-Military Sexual Assault Claims, 17 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 723, 728 (2013); Scott A. Liljegren, Note, Winning the War Against Sexual Harassment
Battle by Battle: Why the Military Justice Model Works—A Proposal for Federal and State Statutory Reform,
38 WASHBURN L.J. 175, 201-03 (1998).
133. Smith v. United States, 196 F.3d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 1999).
134. See generally Feldmeier, supra note 133.
135. See infra Section III.D.v.d. Standing.
136. Smith, 196 F.3d at 778 n.2.
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b. The Political Question Doctrine
If a claimant is not foreclosed by Feres because she seeks an injunction, she
may yet be foreclosed by the political question doctrine. Though the political
question doctrine can trace its roots to the Federalist Papers137 and has long been
accepted in federal courts,138 the foundational test of what constitutes a
nonjusticiable political question is the Supreme Court’s 1962 decision in Baker v.
Carr.139 Couched “as essentially a function of the separation of powers,” Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, articulated a six-factor test to be adjudicated on a
“case-by-case” basis to determine if a matter before a court is a political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.140

But “[l]ower federal courts often erroneously cite the ‘political question
doctrine’ to dismiss as nonjusticiable individual rights claims arising in foreign or
military affairs contexts . . . .”141 In considering why courts misapply the doctrine,
one reason stands out: it grants courts “an invitation to dismiss cases they do not
want to adjudicate.”142
For example, when a member of the Sikh religion sued the Army for refusing
his enlistment, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals felt it was prudent to defer to
the military instead of getting to the constitutional issue at heart:
[T]he doctrine of limited reviewability of certain military regulations and
decisions is a matter of justiciability, analogous to the political questions
doctrine.

137. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 248 (2002) (citing Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 424 (1996)); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton). Pushaw delves deep into The Federalist Papers to
demonstrate Hamilton’s “foreshadow[ing of] the political question doctrine.” Supra at 424, 424 n.149
(citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton)); THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, at 360-61
(Madison).
138. Barkow, supra note 139, at 248 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)
(“Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the
executive, can never be made in this court.”)).
139. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
140. Id. at 217.
141. Gwynne Skinner, Misunderstood, Misconstrued, and Now Clearly Dead: The “Political Question
Doctrine” As A Justiciability Doctrine, 29 J. L. & POL. 427, 427 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
142. Id. at 430.
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Although subject matter jurisdiction may indeed exist, the claim may prove
unsuitable for review by a court acting in its traditional judicial role.143

Because cases involving military sexual assault are often foreclosed by Feres,
judicial restraint would typically militate against a court also explaining that
jurisdiction is barred for reasons of the political question doctrine. Thus, it is
extraordinarily rare for such a claim to have judicial ink spilt on the issue. Indeed,
among the subset of cases on Westlaw that discusses the doctrine within the
universe of cases on military sexual assault, only one of them touches on the
political question doctrine. In that case, Saum v. Widnall,144 the trial court laid out a
common-sense framework:
It is beyond such cavil that civilian courts may review military matters when
substantial constitutional rights are in jeopardy or when the military has acted
in violation of applicable statutes or its own regulations. Thus, federal courts
may review matters of internal military affairs (1) to determine whether
military officials “acted outside the scope of [their] powers” or (2) “violat[ed]
their own regulations”; (3) to “question [ ] the constitutionality” of statutes,
executive orders, or regulations relating to the military; (4) to review courtmartial convictions alleged to involve errors of “constitutional proportions”
as well as (5) selective service induction procedures. See id. (citations omitted).
Review is not permitted to “secondguess[sic] judgments requiring military
expertise,” “substitute court orders for discretionary military decisions,” or
where review “might stultify the military in the performance of its vital
mission.”145

The court in Saum correctly found that questions of fact relating to her alleged
sexual abuse was within the court’s jurisdiction. Yet a court that does not wish to
enter this thorny area of jurisprudence may nevertheless choose to avail itself of
hiding behind the political question doctrine.146
c. The Exhaustion of Remedies Doctrine
If a claimant pursues an injunction and can survive motions to dismiss under
the political question doctrine, she may also be blocked from pursuing the claim
by the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, or exhaustion doctrine, which applies in
some jurisdictions.147 The doctrine stands for the proposition that “a party must
exhaust the remedies available to him within the military before he can seek
federal court review of a military determination[.]”148 “The logic of the rule implies
that the remedy is (a) available to him on his initiative (b) more or less immediately

143. Khalsa v. Weinberger, 779 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 787 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir 1985).
144. 912 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Colo. 1996).
145. Id. at 1391 (quoting Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1971) (alteration in original)).
146. See Baldwin v. Dep’t of Def., No. 1:15-cv-00424, slip op. at 9–11 (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2016).
147. Though the doctrine is grounded in Supreme Court precedent, the doctrine itself is not
universally recognized in all jurisdictions but is still active in some. See, e.g.,
NeSmith v. Fulton, 615 F.2d 196, 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (the doctrine “requires a court contemplating
review of an internal military determination first to determine . . . whether intraservice remedies have been
exhausted.” (emphasis added)); Dooley v. Plogar, 491 F.2d 608, 610 (4th Cir. 1974).
148. Edward F. Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies
Requirement, 48 MIL. L. REV. 91, 105 (1970).
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and (c) will substantially protect his claim of right.”149 But the rule itself:
has its roots both in common law and administrative law . . . . By postponing
civil court review of a military determination until the military has had an
opportunity to apply its expertise, exhaustion, like nonreviewability, prevents
unnecessary civilian interference in military matters and ensures military
autonomy over its own business.150

In a law review article penned in 1962, then-Chief Justice Earl Warren echoed
these sentiments:
It is indisputable that the tradition of our country, from the time of the
Revolution until now, has supported the military establishment’s broad
power to deal with its own personnel. The most obvious reason is that the
courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any
particular intrusion upon military authority might have.151

Thirteen years later, the Court issued one of the foundational cases to espouse
the rule, Schlesinger v. Councilman.152 In Councilman, “court-martial charges were
preferred . . . alleg[ing] that Captain Councilman had wrongfully sold, transferred,
and possessed marihuana[sic].”153 As the Councilman majority stated,
implicit in the congressional scheme embodied in the [Uniform Code of
Military Justice] is the view that the military court system generally is
adequate to and responsibly will perform its assigned task. We think this
congressional judgment must be respected and that it must be assumed that
the military court system will vindicate servicemen’s constitutional rights. We
have recognized this, as well as the practical considerations common to all
exhaustion requirements[.]154

But this does not only act as a shield protecting the government from wouldbe habeas petitioners, as was the case in Councilman.155 Indeed “the unique
relationship between military and civilian society counsels strongly against the
exercise of equity power to enjoin courts-martial” more broadly.156
Thus, Councilman stands for the proposition that “federal district courts
should not intervene in military trials in most situations for equitable reasons even
though they have statutory jurisdiction to entertain suits seeking to prohibit the
military from trying certain cases.”157
149. Louis L. Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 BUFF. L. REV 327, 327 (1962).
150. Sherman, supra note 50, at 105–06.
151. Warren, supra note 78, at 187.
152. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
153. Id. at 739.
154. Id. at 758.
155. See generally id.
156. Richard D. Rosen, Civilian Courts and the Military Justice System: Collateral Review of CourtsMartial, 108 MIL. L. REV. 5, 72 (1985) (citing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 756–57 (1975)). In the
opinion, Justice Powell compares the comity rationale to “the peculiar demands of federalism
preclude[ing] equitable intervention by the federal courts in state criminal proceedings.” Rosen, supra
at 72–73 (citing Councilman, 420 U.S. at 757).
157. H. Michael Bartley, Military Law in the 1970’s: The Effects of Schlesinger v. Councilman, 17 A.F.L.
REV. 65, 65 (1975) (emphasis added).
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Therefore, while the exhaustion principle does not preclude military sexual
assault defendants from pursuing vindication of their rights in federal court, it
nevertheless exacts a toll on assault victims. To the contrary, those still in uniform
must bear the “heavy burden [of] undergo[ing] a process they know will be
painful and likely ineffective”158 while maintaining their professionalism. This is
especially difficult when victims serve alongside or under their alleged assailants.
Indeed, according to the Department of Defense’s 2015 Annual Report on Sexual
Assault in the Military,159 “75 percent of the men and women in uniform who have
been sexually assaulted lack the confidence in the military justice system to come
forward and report the crimes committed against them.”160
The toll of forcing a victim to relive the traumatic attack—also known as revictimization161—cannot be understated. Victims repeatedly discuss how
agonizing it is to have intimate details shared and scrutinized by the public.
Consider the case of a female midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy, who, after
being attacked by another student, “was forced to spend more than 25 hours—
over the course of five days—on the stand and was questioned repeatedly about
her attire, her mental health, how she danced, and how she performed oral sex.”162
158. Recent Case, Baldwin v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 1:15-cv-00424-GBL-TCB (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2016),
130 HARV. L. REV. 2243, 2249 (2017).
159. See SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFFICE, DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2016),
http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY15_Annual/FY15_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault_in_the_
Military.pdf.
160. Kirsten Gillibrand, Comprehensive Resource Center for the Military Justice Improvement Act, U.S.
SENATE, http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/mjia. Kirsten Gillibrand, Gillibrand Statement on Latest DOD
SENATE,
Report
on
Sexual
Assault
In
The
Military,
U.S.
https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/news/press/release/gillibrand-statement-on-latest-dod-report-on-sexualassault-in-the-military-2015.
161. See generally AMANDA KONRADI, TAKING THE STAND: RAPE SURVIVORS AND THE PROSECUTION
OF RAPISTS (2007); GREGORY MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE: DOMINATION THROUGH TALK IN THE
COURTROOM (1993). This has also been termed “second rape,” albeit in other contexts. See Diane
Rosenfeld, Uncomfortable Conversations: Confronting the Reality of Target Rape on Campus, 128 HARV. L.
REV. F. 359, 364 (2015) (citing Diane L. Rosenfeld, Schools Must Prevent the “Second Rape”, HARV.
CRIMSON (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/4/4/Harvard-sexual-assault/).
Countless examples illustrate this point. One rape victim describes the traumatic process in the
following terms: “The embarrassment. . . I had to talk about the most intimate things that I hadn’t
shared with anyone except a police officer, to relive all those moments I had only been brave enough
to tell the police officer and never anyone else. You don’t have to bring back the memories – they don’t
go away – but it is difficult to talk about them because of the shame you feel as a victim.”
Amelia Gentleman, Prosecuting sexual assault: ‘Raped all over again’, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/apr/13/rape-sexual-assault-frances-andrade-court. In a
more famous example, the victim of the infamous Stanford Swimmer viewed her attacker’s decision to
go to trial as “add[ing] insult to injury and forc[ing her] to relive the hurt as details about [her] personal
life and sexual assault were brutally dissected before the public.” See Katie J.M. Baker, Here Is The
Powerful Letter The Stanford Victim Read Aloud To Her Attacker, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 3, 2016),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/katiejmbaker/heres-the-powerful-letter-the-stanford-victim-read-to-herra?utm_term=.gcOLow4D#.ekPJYgOA.
162. ROSENTHAL & KOBB, supra note 8, at 9 (citing Annys Shin, Naval Academy rape case investigator
(Sep
3.,
2013),
testifies
that
one
midshipman
changed
his
story,
WASH. POST
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/naval-academy-rape-case-investigator-testifies-about-her-
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No prose can encapsulate the anguish such testimony caused.
Re-victimization is impossible to eradicate so long as we continue to uphold
a fair judiciary—as we obviously should. But the perfect cannot be the enemy of
the good, and mandating an initial trial in military court keeps the victim stationed
either alongside her attacker or those who would wish to retaliate against her. It is
therefore no surprise that this requirement discourages victims from coming
forward who rightfully “have the impression that reporting crimes can lead to
public and degrading questioning and open them up to ill will at campuses and
military installations.”163
d. Standing
Finally, if a party can survive the minefield that is the political question and
exhaustion of remedies doctrines in pursuit of an injunction, she may also parry
challenges to her standing in the case.
“In limiting the judicial power to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ Article III of the
Constitution restricts it to the traditional role of Anglo–American courts, which is
to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by
private or official violation of law.”164 Justice Scalia, in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,165 penned the “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,”
comprised of three requirements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
“actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’”[.] Second, there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—
the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not . . . the result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely
“speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”166

According to the Court, justification for this requirement is to ensure that “the
plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to
warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the
court’s remedial powers on his behalf.”167
Therein lies the source of courts’ claims that military sexual assault victims
pursuing an injunction lack standing: victims may “fail to demonstrate immediate,
irreparable, and imminent harm based on the challenged conduct.”168 Baldwin v.
Department of Defense169 provides a perverse example. In Baldwin, Judge Lee felt
that the plaintiffs “failed to plead any facts demonstrating that future injury is
imminent and actual.” Besides those plaintiffs who had been separated, the court
interviews-with-alleged-victim/2013/09/03/9f604298-14ae-11e3-a10066fa8fd9a50c_story.html?utm_term=.335cb0551965).
163. Id.
164. Summers v. Earth Is. Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (citing U.S. CONST. art III).
165. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
166. Id. at 560–61 (citations omitted) (amendments in original).
167. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
168. Baldwin v. Dep’t of Def., No. 1:15-cv-00424, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2016).
169. See generally id.
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was unpersuaded that “any woman [still in uniform] can assert facts that predict
she will be assaulted in the future such that a tribunal can intervene to stop an
anticipated assault.”170 Such claims, the judge decided, were “speculative and
lack[ed] legal factual support.”171
This begs the question of probabilistic standing, or establishing standing via
asserting that the cause of action an increased likelihood that a harm will arise:
Indeed “[t]here is an unbroken historical practice of federal courts exercising
jurisdiction over claims for prospective relief to prevent threatened injuries that
have not yet occurred.”172 Certainly not all claims are granted standing simply
because there’s a puncher’s chance the plaintiff may be harmed at some
undetermined point in the future. Therefore, “for a plaintiff to have standing, the
threat of injury must be ‘real.’”173 In addition to the tangible harm requirement, it
must be “imminent.”174 In Baldwin, for example, when Judge Lee also offered his
opinion on the question of standing, he claimed that the victims who were still in
uniform did not demonstrate a sufficiently high likelihood that they will be
attacked again, undermining their assertion of standing.175
Unfortunately, Judge Lee’s interpretation is of no surprise. Over the years,
probabilistic standing has been inconsistent at best.176 Recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence is no exception: “The [Roberts] Court has failed to develop a unitary
formula for determining how likely it must be that a threat will ripen into a more
palpable injury, or that a judicial ruling would redress an injury or threat thereof,
in order for a plaintiff to have standing.”177 If anything, “the Court has demanded
elevated showings of likely injury by parties seeking injunctive relief from policies
that relate closely to national security.”178
This has obvious and long-lasting deleterious effects on plaintiffs.
[The Court’s] narrow construction [of probabilistic standing] is consistent
with “anxieties about judicial competence that . . . frequently underlie rulings
that plaintiffs who seek injunctive remedies against sensitive governmental
operations have no standing” and functionally requires a victim to choose
between removing herself from ongoing harm by resigning and obtaining

170. Id. at 8.
171. Id. at 9.
172. F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 61 (2012) (citing Vicksburg
Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65, 82 (1902) (holding that a “threatened” injury from illegal
activity presented an actual case)); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (recognizing standing for a party who “personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury” (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
91, 99 (1979))).
173. Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 101 (1983); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1969); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 89–91 (1947)).
174. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
175. Baldwin v. Dep’t of Def., No. 1:15-cv-00424, slip op. at 7–9 (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2016).
176. See generally Hessick, supra note 172.
177. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1069 (2015).
178. Id. at 1090.
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judicial recourse.179

In addition to offering judges an avenue by which to avoid deciding
controversial cases, the discretion created by the, the “incoherence of the
[probabilistic standing] doctrine gives scope for ‘the strong tendency of judges to
engage in ideologically driven doctrinal manipulation in standing cases.’”180 As
Professor Richard Pierce demonstrated empirically, “a Republican judge was
almost four times as likely as a Democratic judge to vote to deny an environmental
plaintiff standing.”181 Thus, be it for political reasons or simply to avoid upsetting
the balance of power in military affairs, courts have more than enough precedent
to hide behind on standing grounds.
5. Back-filling Cycles and Self-Perpetuation
Each of these failures may be containable when isolated, but because they are
so intimately interwoven, together they produce a back-filling cycle that
perpetuates, if not exacerbates, each. Victims will bring forward charges, face
tough sledding to get charges preferred against her attacker, and proceed at the
whim of a panel that can be manipulated to militate against a conviction. So the
victim must sit through her re-victimization knowing her infinitesimally low odds
of vindication as well as the practical impossibility of seeking alternatives in
federal courts.
This takes place as the victim is retaliated against and faces new charges
against her simply for bringing up her attack. It truly is no wonder victims hesitate
to come forward.
Yet their hesitance only emboldens attackers. Akin to those who would
violate restraining orders without punishment,182 those who would attack their
fellow soldier without so much as a peep in response crystallize their belief both
that they are above the law and that those whom they attack are unworthy of its
protections.
III. CURING THE ROOT: IMPROVEMENTS TO THE UNDERLYING SYSTEM
Many have already discussed the ways the United States military has already
improved and can continue to improve the underlying currents discussed infra. It
is worth briefly recounting some strategies that have been theorized or
implemented. But before expounding on a few key strategies, we should also note
that implementation of legal regimes may not prove 100% effective. As Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor once wrote: “appearances do matter.”183 Taking each of the
above steps would undoubtedly go a long way toward curbing the sentiment that

179. Recent Case, supra note 158, (citing Fallon, supra note 177, at 1111).
180. Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 502 (2008) (citing Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1760 (1999)).
181. Pierce, supra note 180, at 1760.
182. See, e.g., Diane L. Rosenfeld, Correlative Rights and Boundaries of Freedom: Protecting the Civil
Rights of Endangered Women, 43 HARV. C.R. C.L.L. REV. 257, 262 (2008). (“This feature is important
because violations of an order of protection signify that the offender believes he can violate the court
order with impunity.”).
183. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
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women are undeserving of equal status in protecting our country. But making
hay—and doing so genuinely—while enacting these policies and trumpeting their
successes is vital to the cause. Conversely, it must also be stated that simply
offering the occasional few words on the problem does little to combat these deepseated issues. Success will only be the byproduct of both serious rhetoric and
serious action.184 Thankfully, some strategies have been enacted and executed to
begin to attack the stronghold of sexism within the military. These are discussed
in greater detail below.
A. Allowing Women into the Service Academies and Combat-Oriented Roles
As shown above, women have made substantial progress in serving equally
in our nation’s armed forces. But if even a sliver of male soldiers’ motivation to
sexually assault their female counterparts is the belief that female servicepersons
have less, if any, value to the military, increasing the role of women such that they
may be able to demonstrate their inherent value as equals will go a long way.
When the announcement was made that the Pentagon was opening combat
positions to women, Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(the highest ranking uniformed serviceperson) and a graduate of the United States
Military Academy was asked to comment on the policy change. “Recalling his
days at West Point, Dempsey told reporters that the military academy had become
a much higher quality institution after the admission of women. The same
transformative property would hopefully be seen in changing the culture of the
military regarding sexual assault” by opening positions to women.185 He
continued:
When you have one part of the population that is designated as ‘warriors’ and
one part that is designated as something else, that disparity begins to establish
a psychology that — in some cases — led to that environment [of sexual
assault]. I have to believe the more we treat people equally, the more likely
they are to treat each other equally.186

Chairman Dempsey’s comments could not have been more on the mark.187
As women continue to pursue and thrive in newly opened roles, the belief that
they are in any way undeserving of equal respect will diminish.

184. Admittedly, the idea of seriousness is a tough line to toe: being too vocal can perversely
influence command in favor of prosecuting sexual assault, leading to further convictions. See supra
notes 100–102 and accompanying text
185. Hayes Brown, Allowing Women On The Front Lines Could Reduce Sexual Assault, Joint Chiefs
Chairman Says, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 24, 2013), https://thinkprogress.org/allowing-women-on-thefront-lines-could-reduce-sexual-assault-joint-chiefs-chairman-says-e1c19a6b4344#.hj8ic71mg.
186. Id.
187. Notably, among the first class of women graduates of the service academies, men’s “attrition
rate due to academic failure was twice that of women.” Women Enter the Military Academies, WOMEN’S
MEMORIAL, http://www.womensmemorial.org/history/detail/?s=women-enter-the-military-academies
(last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
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B. Improving the Military Justice System At Large
In the last decade alone, there have been significant amendments to the courtmartial system to correct some of the inadequacies of the system. Senator Claire
McCaskill (D–MD) offers a partial list:
Commanders have been stripped of the power to overturn convictions & are
accountable under rigorous new standards.
Every victim who reports a sexual assault gets their own independent lawyer
to protect their rights and fight for their interests . . . .
Civilian review is now required if a commander decides against a prosecution
in a sexual assault case when a prosecutor wants to go to trial.
Dishonorable discharge is now a required minimum sentence for anyone
convicted of a sexual assault. . . .
It is now a crime for any servicemember to retaliate against a victim who
reports a sexual assault. . . . .
The pre-trial “Article 32” process . . . has been reformed to better protect
victims.
The statute of limitations in these cases has now been eliminated
The “good soldier” defense has been eliminated for servicemembers accused
of sexual assault under most circumstances . . . .
Survivors can now challenge their discharge or separation from service.
The role of the prosecutor in advising commanders on going to court-martial
has been strengthened.
Accountability over commanders has been boosted for setting appropriate
command climate.
Protections have been extended to the Military Service Academies.188

Last year, Senator McCaskill introduced the Military Retaliation Prevention
Act alongside Senator Joni Ernst “to help protect survivors of sexual assault from
peer-to-peer retaliation.”189 Thankfully, the Act was signed into law “as part of the
2017 national defense bill.”190

188. SEN. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, COMBATTING SEXUAL ASSAULTS IN THE MILITARY (2015),
http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CombattingSexualAssaultsintheMilitary.pdf.
189. Combatting Sexual Violence, SEN. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, https://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/
violence (last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
190. Id.
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As Senator McCaskill’s literature states:
[The Military Retaliation Prevention Act] expands on previous efforts to
combat retaliation by making it its own unique offense under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and requiring specific training for investigators on
how to handle claims of retaliation including all military criminal
investigators, IG investigators, or any personnel assigned by commanders to
investigate the complaint.191

These are all incredibly important corrections that will likely improve
victims’ ability to obtain justice.
C. Offering Trauma-Related Care
The Department of Veterans Affairs is responsible for the treatment and care
of those who have since separated from the military. Given the disparities in
combat service between the sexes, treating only physical and mental wounds
stemming from combat would decidedly favor men. But that isn’t the case. Indeed
the VA offers counseling service for victims of military sexual assault (which, as
detailed earlier, impacts women at far greater rates192):
VA provides all care for mental and physical health conditions related to MST
[Military Sexual Trauma] free of charge, and Veterans do not need to have
reported their experiences of MST at the time or have other documentation
that they occurred in order to receive free MST-related health care. Service
connection (VA disability compensation) is also not required, and Veterans
may be able to receive free MST-related care even if they are not eligible for
other VA care.193

The VA and the military in general signal the equal value placed on male and
female veterans by taking military sexual assault seriously enough to offer such
widespread counseling at no cost to those suffering from subsequent trauma.
However, it must be noted that the picture is not all rosy. This treatment
assumes that the veteran victim is eligible for VA benefits. A 2016 report from
Human Rights Watch:
found that many rape victims suffering from trauma were unfairly discharged
for a “personality disorder” or other mental health condition that makes them
ineligible for benefits. Others were given “Other Than Honorable” discharges
for misconduct related to the assault that shut them out of the Department of
Veterans Affairs healthcare system and a broad range of educational and
financial assistance.194

191. Id.
192. See supra note 14.
193. Kayla Williams, VA offers free Military Sexual Trauma health care services to Veterans regardless of
service-connected status, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS: VANTAGE POINT (Mar. 10, 2017, 10:58 A.M.),
http://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/35859/va-offers-free-military-sexual-trauma-health-care-servicesto-veterans-regardless-of-service-connected-status-2/.
194. US: Raped in Military – Then Punished, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 19, 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/19/us-raped-military-then-punished (citing SARA DAREHSHORI,
BOOTED: LACK OF RECOURSE FOR WRONGFULLY DISCHARGED US MILITARY RAPE SURVIVORS (2016),
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If survivors are unfairly marked with “bad papers,” they would become
ineligible for the care they deserve and often need. To take full advantage of the
VA’s efforts to offer counseling and other medical services, this practice must be
stopped.
D. Strategies Yet To Be Enacted
Though many of these strategies have been enacted, too many languish on
policy room floors. For example, there is reason to believe that the single-sex
selective service requirement is unconstitutional on equal-protection grounds
because of the growing importance and participation of our nation’s
servicewomen.195 But on a policy ground, making the requirement apply to both
men and women would be both an important symbol as well as an important step
in demonstrating the military is a viable option for women. There are other
important steps the military could take outside of the arguably symbolic selective
service modification, such as more extensive trainings on sexual assault from day
one, more robust protections for those serving, and better representation and
treatment for survivors, including mental health benefits.
IV. CURING THE FRUIT: SEEKING SOURCES OF LEGAL REDRESS
Eradicating some of these deep-seated views and beliefs may well prove
generational. Until such a change gains a stronghold in society, we must critically
consider how to better serve victims and mere out justice to their attackers, both
within and outside of the military justice system.
A. Internal Changes: Amending the UCMJ
Two major bipartisan legislative proposals have been put forward by
members of Congress to amend the UCMJ in order to better protect victims of
sexual assault. Each is discussed below; Congress would be wise to enact both
pieces of legislation wholesale.
1. The Military Justice Improvement Act
To directly combat the role of undue command influence in prosecuting
decisions relating to sexual assault charges, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand has
championed the Military Justice Improvement Act.196 This Act, which has twice
gained majority support but could not overcome the Senate’s 60-vote filibuster
threshold,197 “would remove commanders from the decision to prosecute serious
crimes, such as sexual assault and murder, while leaving uniquely military crimes

https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/19/booted/lack-recourse-wrongfully-discharged-us-militaryrape-survivors.).
195. Spivak & Aliano, supra note 42; Russell Spivak & Adam Aliano, G.I. Jane and the Selective
Service: Equal Protection Challenges to Male-Only Selective Service in the Modern Military, HARV. J. LEG.
ONLINE (Aug. 5, 2016), http://harvardjol.com/2016/08/05/gi-jane-and-the-selective-service-equalprotection-challenges-to-male-only-selective-service-in-the-modern-military/.
196. See Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 1752, 113th Cong. (2013).
197. See Emily Crockett, Military Sexual Assault Reform Blocked Again in Senate, REWIRE (Jun 17, 2015,
2:54 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2015/06/17/military-sexual-assault-reform-blocked-senate/.
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to the chain of command.”198 Therefore, when sexual assault is alleged, a
prosecution’s potential disruption to the unit is irrelevant: only the likelihood that
the crime was committed is determinative to whether it’s charged. But, for
example, charging decisions relating to allegations of fraudulent enlistment,
desertion, absent without leave, mutiny, and other obviously military crimes
remain squarely in the commander’s jurisdiction and within his prerogative.199
According to Gillibrand, these measures would ensure that prosecution
“decisions [would be] based on evidence rather than the interest in preserving
good order and discipline.”200 Indeed “[t]he shared experiences of our allies — the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia — have demonstrated that removing
felonies [including sexual assault] from their systems of military justice has
increased the fairness and transparency of criminal trials, while maintaining the
commander’s ability to ensure good order and discipline.”201 Senator Gillibrand’s
website features testimonials from high-ranking officials of all three countries that
vouch that such frameworks have not yielded negative consequences in their own
armed forces.202
2. The Protecting Military Honor Act
In July, 2017, Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced the Protecting Military
Honor Act203; Representative Jaime Herrera Beutler introduced a nearly identical
bill in the House.204 The multi-faceted bill aims to cure many of the ills found in
the discharge process for victims of sexual assault.205 For example, for victims who
were mischaracterized in their discharge and thus were not entitled to health care
related to a sexual assault, the bill:
Codifies requirements for how each military branch handles cases related to
sexual assault survivors and improves the process by which sexual assault
survivors may challenge the terms or characterization of their discharge or
separation from the armed forces
[R]equires military to give victims proper examination to ensure they don’t
have a mental health condition that was caused by the trauma from the sexual
assault

198. Joyner & Weirick, supra note 101.
199. Military Justice Improvement Act: Excluded Offenses, SEN. KRISTEN GILLIBRAND,
https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/mjia/excluded-offenses (last visited Aug. 15, 2017).
200. Joyner & Weirick, supra note 101 (quoting Senator Gillibrand).
201. Id.
202. Military Justice Improvement Act: Allies Testimony, SEN. KRISTEN GILLIBRAND,
https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/mjia/allies-testimony (last visited Aug. 15, 2017) (testimonials from
Maj. Gen. Blaise Cathcart, Advocate General of the Canadian Armed Forces; Maj. Gen. Steve Noonan,
Deputy Commander, Canadian Joint Operations Command; Air Comm. Paul Cronan, Director
General, Australian Defense Force Legal Service; Comm. Andrei Spence, Commodore Naval Legal
Services, Royal Navy, UK stating that “implementation of similar policies” “[w]ill [n]ot [d]isrupt
‘[g]ood [o]rder [a]nd [d]iscipline’”).
203. S.1543, 115th Cong. (2017).
204. H.R. 3209, 115th Cong. (2017).
205. See supra note 194.
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Ensures sexual assault survivors have the right to a hearing to request a
discharge upgrade
Allows victims to appeal to federal court for review and ensures the Discharge
Review Boards are accountable to judicial review.206

Additionally, the bill removes statutes of limitations for such challenges,
strengthens protections against whistleblower retaliation, and requires the boards
making such determinations have additional protections for victims.207
Congress should immediately adopt both of these measures. The MJIA would
remove command influence from the equation, making it easier for victims to
report when they have been assaulted. This both reduces fear of reprisals and does
not disrupt a commanding officer’s prerogative to prosecute military-specific
offenses. The PMHA, on the other hand, would minimize many crucial negative
effects victims face beyond the proceedings themselves, particularly as they relate
to victims’ long-term care. By adopting both of these bills simultaneously,
Congress could address the problem holistically. Leaving either unenacted means
victims remain vulnerable to substantial wrongs.
B. External Changes: Prying the Door Open for Suit
Undoubtedly, the inability to amend the UCMJ for victims to seek justice
more readily within the court martial would be a setback for justice: but all would
not be lost, as adjustments could still be made in the surrounding avenues to
effectively mete out justice in the federal system. Discarding—or at least
amending—the Feres doctrine is the most likely avenue of success.
1. Jettisoning Feres In Part or In Whole
The Feres doctrine has been stretched far beyond anything the Supreme Court
intended it to cover. More, the underlying justifications of the holding have been
debunked and or no longer apply. It is therefore eminently reasonable to jettison
the doctrine in part, if not in whole. This idea is thoroughly unoriginal. But because
the doctrine rests upon what can only be charitably deemed as dubious footholds,
it is certainly worth reviewing why such an option is so attractive.
In Feres, the Supreme Court stated “servicemen could not recover under the
FTCA for injuries that ‘arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.’”208

206. Press Release, Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler, Jaime Herrera Beutler Introduces Bill to Protect
Military Sexual Assault Survivors (July 12, 2017) (https://herrerabeutler.house.gov/news/document
single.aspx?DocumentID=398928).
207. See id.; Press Release, Senator Richard Blumenthal, Blumenthal Introduces Bill to Reform
Military Discharge Process, Aid Survivors of Sexual Assault (July 12, 2017)
(https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-introduces-bill-to-reformmilitary-discharge-process-aid-survivors-of-sexual-assault).
208. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 694 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)) (emphasis added).
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The Court gave three reasons for its holding:
First, the parallel private liability required by the FTCA was absent. Second,
Congress could not have intended that local tort law govern the “distinctively
federal” relationship between the Government and enlisted personnel. Third,
Congress could not have intended to make FTCA suits available to
servicemen who have already received veterans’ benefits to compensate for
injuries suffered incident to service. Several years after Feres [the Court]
thought of a fourth rationale: Congress could not have intended to permit
suits for service-related injuries because they would unduly interfere with
military discipline.209

But the year before the Court decided Feres, it examined a similar case: Brooks
v. United States.210
In Brooks, the Supreme Court permitted recovery under the FTCA to two
servicemen, the Brooks brothers, who had been “on furlough, driving along
the highway, under compulsion of no orders or duty and on no military
mission [when] a government owned and operated vehicle collided with
[them].” Attempting to distinguish its previous holding in Brooks, the Feres
court noted that “[t]he injury to Brooks did not arise out of or in the course of
military duty,” and that the “Brooks’s relationship [to the government] while
on leave was not analogous to that of a soldier injured while performing
duties under orders.”

But the plaintiffs in Brooks were eligible for precisely the same set of
government benefits as were the plaintiffs in Feres, and indeed they originally
collected them in addition to receiving their FTCA awards.211
Therefore, it appears as if the Court, and lower courts by extension, has
constructively overturned Brooks in stretching Feres to its utmost limits over time.
Given the original holding of Brooks made up of the exact same court, stretching
Feres so broadly was clearly not the Court’s intent. Thus at a minimum, it is
necessary to revisit the doctrine.
Since deciding Feres, the Supreme Court itself “subsequently recognized [its]
error and rejected Feres’ “parallel private liability’ rationale.”212 Feres’s other factors
have “similarly been denominated ‘no longer controlling.’”213 So if the reasoning
the Feres doctrine rests on has been self-immolated, that alone should be sufficient
to overturn it.214

209. Id.
210. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
211. Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1039 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
212. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 694–95 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352
U.S. 315, 319 (1957); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66–69 (1955)).
213. Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58, n.4 (1985)).
214. This meets the “fairly settled” factors required to overturn a case. See Drew C. Ensign, The
Impact of Liberty on Stare Decisis: The Rehnquist Court from Casey to Lawrence, 81 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1137, 1141
(2006) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (“whether the rule
has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a
kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity
to the cost of repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the
old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, see; or whether facts have so changed, or come
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As stated above, the Court has already acknowledged that the issue has been
seen differently so “as to have robbed the old rule of significant . . . justification.”
Moreover, circuit courts of appeal have outright admitted that “[a]pplication of the
Feres doctrine does not depend on the extent to which its rationales are present in
a particular case. Rather, the test is whether the injuries are based on ‘servicerelated activities.’”215 This is nothing more than an admission of defeat. The only
remnant of the original doctrine is its outcome, not its justification. It is therefore
a prime candidate for rebuffing the doctrine of stare decisis.
But even beyond its fading justification, there are other reasons to question
the doctrine, namely its equal protection concerns and the separation of powers.
First, there is reason to believe that the doctrine “runs afoul of the Equal
Protection clause of the 14th and 5th Amendments.”216 Put simply, those that
already sacrifice for their country are forced to make even greater sacrifices by
foregoing just compensation for harm to which they would otherwise be entitled.
In Justice Scalia’s own words:
Had Lieutenant Commander Johnson been piloting a commercial helicopter
when he crashed into the side of a mountain, his widow and children could
have sued and recovered for their loss. But because Johnson devoted his life
to serving in his country’s Armed Forces, the Court today limits his family to
a fraction of the recovery they might otherwise have received.217

The separation of powers argument is similarly strong. The FTCA explicitly
waives sovereign immunity, but it does have some exceptions. Notable here,
“Congress excluded claims arising out of a number of government activities,
including ‘[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.’”218 Feres stretched that language to
mean “that service members cannot bring tort suits against the Government for
injuries that ‘arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.’”219
Courts have further extended this theory to the point that it “displaces the plain
language of the Tort Claims Act.”220

to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification”
(internal quotations and citations omitted))).
215. Maas v. United States, 94 F.3d 291, 295 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d
844, 848–49 (9th Cir. 1996); Bon v. United States, 802 F.2d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1986); Pringle v. United
States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2000); Schoemer v. United States, 59 F.3d 26, 28–29 (5th Cir. 1995).
216. Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J. dissenting).
217. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Costo, 248 F.3d at 875–76
(Ferguson, J. dissenting) (“The articulated “rational bases” for the Feres doctrine lead in this case, as in
many cases, to inconsistent results that have no relation to the original purpose of Feres. Less than half
of the persons on the rafting trip that claimed the lives of Costo and Graham were identified as
members of the armed services. The holding today would have allowed any of the civilians injured or
killed on the trip to sue, but barred such recourse to the military personnel, despite the fact that the
two suits would have implicated virtually identical policy concerns regarding the law of the situs and
military decision-making. On the other hand, had Costo and Graham participated in a similar rafting
trip run entirely by civilians, they may have been able to sue, yet still collect veteran’s benefits.”).
218. Costo, 248 F.3d at 869 (Ferguson, J. dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (emphasis added)).
219. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 686 (1987) (citing Feres, 340 U.S., at 146).
220. Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 674 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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By creating this extended theory out of whole cloth, the judiciary has rewritten an otherwise constitutional statute, in violation of the separation of
powers.221
There may be a slightly more palatable alternative: creating an exception to
the Feres doctrine. Many of the incidents in which the Feres doctrine barred suit
have a direct relation to the plaintiff’s service. For example, soldiers’ alleged
maltreatment at military medical facilities,222 injuries sustained while being
transported to a military hospital for a mandatory physical,223 and injuries
stemming from exposure to harmful materials while serving224 all have distinct
relevance to a soldier’s actual service.
Ms. Hall’s sexual assault while studying at the Air Force Academy cannot in
any way be fairly understood as “aris[ing] out of or . . . in the course of activity
incident to service.” Put another way, “where there is no relevant relationship
between the service member’s behavior and the military interests that might be
jeopardized by civil suits, the Feres doctrine cannot bar recovery.”225 But in
practice, Feres has been overextended to encompass anyone and anything
remotely or tangentially related to the military. Thus, we ought to reexamine what
truly defines being “incident to” or “arising out of” military service.
These key phrases connote, if not demand, a causal connection. In the case of
Ms. Hall, for example, her studies as a cadet and her actions taken under official
orders encompass activities that would be incident to service. Her gender and
sexual objectification, on the other hand, are not. The same holds true for all other
women that have been victimized while serving their country.
Therefore, even if the judiciary incorrectly believes that the Feres doctrine
ought to remain intact, there is room “for a sexual assault exception.”

221. See id. at 674 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194–195
(1978).
222. See, e.g., Matthew v. United States, 311 Fed. Appx. 409, 412 (2d Cir. 2009); Loughney v. United
States, 839 F.2d 186, 188 (3d Cir. 1988).
223. See, e.g., Wake v. United States, 89 F.3d 53, 62 (2d Cir. 1996);
224. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 194, 200 (2d Cir. 1987);
Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567, 568 (3d Cir. 1983).
225. Johnson v. United States, 704 F2d 1431, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Woodside v. United
States, 606 F.2d at 141, 142 (“Feres requires that there be some proximate relationship between the
service member’s activities and the Armed Forces. . .. [W]here the soldier demonstrates that the activity
has no significant link to the Armed Forces and is remote to his military service, suit under the Act has
been allowed.”); Camassar v. United States, 400 F.Supp. 894, 897 (D.Conn.1975) (“the more realistically
critical test of whether” Feres should apply “is the existence or absence of meaningful causal connection
between the injury occurrence and the injured person’s military service”) aff’d, 531 F.2d 1149 (2d
Cir.1976); Schwager v. United States, 279 F.Supp. 262, 263 (E.D.Pa.1968) (application of Feres depends
on the “relevant links” between the military and the service member’s activity and requires “a
measuring of the degree to which the activity is divorced from or related to military service.”); Downes
v. United States, 249 F.Supp. 626, 628 (1965) (stating that Feres should only be applied when the service
member is “performing duties of such a character” so that a civil suit would “undermine the traditional
concepts of military discipline.”)).

Undue Sacrifice MACRO Final (Do Not Delete)

1/10/2018 6:40 PM

UNDUE SACRIFICE

117

2. Amending Legislation Such As Title VII to Extend Protections
In 1995, a former enlisted Airman in the United States Air Force named
Cheryl Corey filed suit against the Air Force for, among other things, violating
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.226 The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court’s
dismissal of the suit: “Unfortunately for Ms. Corey, it [was and remains] well
settled [that] Title VII does not afford protections to uniformed personnel of the
various armed forces.”227 The statute explicitly “extends Title VII coverage to
‘employees . . . in military departments as defined in section 102 of Title 5.’”228 But
employees are not the same as military personnel in uniform. Indeed, in discussing
the distinction between the two, “the Ninth Circuit concluded ‘[t]he two differing
definitions show that Congress intended a distinction between ‘military
departments’ and ‘armed forces,’ the former consisting of civilian employees, the
latter of uniformed military personnel.’”229 The Tenth Circuit was reassured that
its sister circuits came to similar conclusions.230
Although these circuit courts were correct in their interpretation, these bars
can and should be amended through legislative action. Correcting the Title VII
oversights and similar gaps in other Acts231 will allow women to pursue justice
when it is unattainable elsewhere.
V. A SNAKEOIL ANTIDOTE: DOE V. HAGENBECK
Returning to the main culprit, Feres, there was a temporary—but dashed—
glimmer of hope: Doe v. Hagenbeck.232 The plaintiff, Jane Doe,233 was a female cadet
at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Doe, who was raped on
campus, alleged “rampant sexual hostility . . . forced her to resign as a cadet and
be honorably discharged.”234 She sued the Superintendent of West Point, Lt. Gen.
Franklin Hagenbeck, and the Commandant of Cadets at West Point, Brig. Gen.
William Rapp, the two men in charge of the school at the time of the alleged
conduct.235 The trial court granted motions to dismiss on all of her claims save one:
an assertion that her constitutional right to Equal Protection of the laws was
violated.236 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the

226. Corey v. United States, No. 96-6409, 1997 WL 474521, at *1 (10th Cir. 1997).
227. Id.
228. Id. at *2 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)).
229. Id. (citing Gonzalez v. Department of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928–29 (9th Cir. 1983)).
230. See Corey, 1997 WL 474521, at *2 (citing Roper v. Department of Army, 832 F.2d 247, 248 (2d
Cir. 1987) (“we cannot agree to the extension of Title VII to uniformed members of the armed
forces.”); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1200 (8th Cir. 1981)).
231. See Natashia Tidwell, Note, Soldiers of Misfortune: The Justiciability of Injunctive Relief Actions in
the Federal Courts and the U.S. Military’s Mandatory Anthrax Inoculation Program,
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 429, 442 (2003) (listing Acts that could be amended to offer women a legal
remedy).
232. 98 F.Supp.3d 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
233. District Judge Alvin Hellerstein granted the plaintiff’s motion to proceed under a fictitious
name. See id. at 676 n.1.
234. Doe, 98 F.Supp.3d at 676.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 692.
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trial court’s denial.237 While disappointing, conflicting precedent makes it possible
that the entire circuit rehears the case en banc or that the Supreme Court finally
takes up such a case to clarify the Feres progeny’s “incoheren[t]” area of law.238
A. Background
The underlying factual history is vital to understanding Doe’s holdings as
well as its potential legal significance. Thus, this section first explains the facts and
law underlying the claim. Then, I extrapolate how this holding—if upheld—could
be a powerful lever for victimized service members.
Ms. Doe’s complaint states that she thrived in her first years as a West Point
cadet—at least until she was allegedly raped by a classmate and friend.239 After
taking a prescribed sedative, she claims to have consumed alcohol offered to her
by a male classmate and soon thereafter, lost consciousness.240 Her complaint
reads:
He attacked Ms. Doe and had forcible, non-consensual intercourse with her.
Ms. Doe remembers lying on the concrete floor of a boiler room, not
understanding what was going on. She does not remember the details of the
attack.
Ms. Doe woke up a few hours later in her bed, on or about the morning of
May 9, 2010, with dirt on her clothes and hair, bruises on her lower back, and
blood between her legs. Ms. Doe was confused and alarmed. She confided in
a friend, who advised her to obtain emergency contraception.241

Doe heeded her friend’s advice in addition to getting an STD test and a
vaginal examination, which showed signs of tearing.242 The clinic “did not conduct
a forensic examination to collect evidence (as is required by DOD regulations).”243
In the wake of the attack, Doe was referred and met once with Maj. Maria
Burger, West Point’s Sexual Assault Response Counselor, who informed Doe of
her ability to report the assault.244 Doe received only one follow-up from West
Point staff to check in on her mental and emotional wellbeing.245

237. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 50 (2d Cir. 2017).
238. Taber v. Maine, 67 F. 3d 1029, 1039 (2d Cir. 1995).
239. Second Amended Complaint at 3, Doe, 98 F.Supp.3d 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 13 CIV. 2802)
(“A representative faculty evaluation stated, ‘CDT [Doe] has what it takes . . . she is one of the most
professional and internally motivated cadets I’ve worked with . . . . I am confident that she will excel
as an Army officer. I would gladly recruit her to serve on my team, regardless of the mission.’”)
[hereinafter Second Amended Complaint].
240. Id. at 6.
241. Id. at 7.
242. Doe v. Hagenbeck, 98 F.Supp.3d 672, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
243. Id.
244. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 239, at 7. Particularly, Maj. Burger told Doe she could
report it either as unrestricted or restricted. The reporting types are explained above. See supra notes
87–88 and accompanying text.
245. Id. at 8.

Undue Sacrifice MACRO Final (Do Not Delete)

1/10/2018 6:40 PM

UNDUE SACRIFICE

119

Doe’s subsequent trauma brought about her decision to leave West Point
altogether:
Her anxiety after the sexual assault became intolerable. Ms. Doe knew that if
she left West Point after the start of her third year, she would be contractually
required to repay the cost of her education. This was a financial risk that Ms.
Doe was unable to take.246

That is only half the story. Now, I turn to the defendants.
B. But How Are Hagenbeck and Rapp Connected?
Doe alleges that Hagenbeck and Rapp failed to uphold their duties, leading
to an infringement on her rights. Citing a “misogynistic culture at West Point that
marginalized Ms. Doe and other female cadets, [which] caused them to be
subjected to routine harassment, suffer emotional distress and other harms, and
be pressured to conform to male norms,”247 Doe alleges that Hagenbeck and Rapp
failed to uphold their duties to protect cadets against sexual assault.248 Doe points
to a rash of specific instances of gender discrimination, often tacitly endorsed by
faculty.249 Doe claims that this cycle is perpetuated in part because only 15% of
cadets were female and because “West Point has been unwilling to increase the
number of female cadets in each entering class, despite having enough qualified
candidates to do so.”250 Finally, Doe refers to the Administration’s substandard
handling of her own attack as a manifestation of Hagenbeck’s and Rapp’s
failures.251
There is quantifiable evidence to support Doe’s claim. For example, for the
time Doe was a cadet, the Defense Department “cited the academy for failing to
provide clear and complete information on how to report a sexual assault” and
“determined that West Point failed to provide required training to all cadets, thus
falling short of DoD’s minimum standards, and lacked an institutionalized
comprehensive sexual assault prevention and response curriculum.”252 And

246. Id. Cadets who resign from West Point before beginning their third year do not have an
obligation to enlist, see 10 U.S.C. § 4348; 32 C.F.R. § 217.4(d), nor do they have to pay for their time in
school, see Cadet Oath, 10 U.S.C. § 4348.
247. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 239, at 3.
248. Doe v. Hagenbeck, 98 F.Supp.3d 672, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“10 U.S.C. § 4361 provides that the
Secretary of Defense and the Superintendent of West Point are to “prescribe a policy on sexual
harassment and sexual violence applicable to the cadets and other personnel of the Academy”, and
provide “required training on the policy for all cadets and other Academy personnel”. Further, the
Superintendent of West Point is given a statutory responsibility to conduct yearly assessments of the
effectiveness of policies, training, and procedures intended to reduce sexual harassment and sexual
violence. 10 U.S.C. § 4361(c). The Superintendent of West Point is also required to conduct an annual
evaluation of the number of sexual assaults, rapes, and other offenses involving cadets or West Point
faculty and report these statistics to the Department of Defense (“DOD”). 10 U.S.C. § 4361(d).”).
249. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 239, at 3–4 (citing instances of sexual chants around
campus, derogatory comments made towards women and discussions of sexual exploits ignored or
encouraged by faculty members.).
250. Id. at 3.
251. See generally id.
252. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee,
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“[a]ccording to 61% of female cadets who chose not to report, concerns about harm
to their reputations and standing at West Point were reasons they did not
report.”253 These statistics suggest Hagenbeck’s and Rapp’s leadership over West
Point’s Corps of Cadets did not adequately protect female cadets’ ability to serve
equally and without fear of assault.
C. Procedural History and The Trial Court’s Decision
In her original and first amended complaints, Doe put forth causes of action
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the Tucker Act, and the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss on all counts. Judge Hellerstein of the Southern District of New
York ruled in favor of the defendants on all but the equal protection claim,
directing Doe to amend her complaint to reflect the ruling, which she did.254
Doe’s FTCA claims were dismissed because Hagenbeck’s and Rapp’s
discretion in carrying out their duties shielded them from liability.255 The FTCA
grants a private right of action for damages when a government agent or
employee, acting within the scope of his or her employment, causes an injury.256
However, there is a statutory exception that bars claims “based upon [a
government official’s] exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function.”257 Because Hagenbeck and Rapp were acting within their
discretion in implementing the Army’s sexual assault policies throughout West
Point, Judge Hellerstein ruled that the two Generals fell under the exception.258
The Tucker Act259 deals with claims against the government “for the recovery
of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed
or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or
any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected
under the internal-revenue laws.”260 If the recovery is over $10,000, the U.S. Federal
Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction; if the claim is for under $10,000, the
Court of Claims and District Court have concurrent jurisdiction.261 Doe claimed
that her Oath of Allegiance to serve upon acceptance to West Point created an
“educational contract.”262 Though the Oath did constitute a contract,263 Judge
Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, at *8 (2d Cir. 2017), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_
document/2016.3.17_doe_-_west_point_amicus_brief_final_refiled.pdf (citing Department of Defense,
SAPR, Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies,
Academic Program Year 2010-2011, 33, 24, 28 (2011), http://bit.ly/22dG4MD).
253. Id. at 8–9 (citing DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER, 2010 SERVICE 8 ACADEMY GENDER
RELATIONS SURVEY 48, Table 20 (2010), http://bit.ly/21jGf3e.)
254. Doe v. Hagenbeck, 98 F.Supp.3d 672, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
255. See id. at 690.
256. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
257. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (emphasis added).
258. See Doe, 98 F.Supp.3d at 690.
259. 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
260. Id. § 1346 (a)(1).
261. Id. § 1346 (a)(2).
262. Doe, 98 F.Supp.3d at 692.
263. Id. (“An educational services contract can be the basis of such a claim. The United States, itself,
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Hellerstein held that because “[t]he government did not stop providing Doe with
an education, room, and board,” the government did not in fact fall short of its
contractual obligation.264
In 1971, the Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents265 that a
violation of one’s Fourth Amendment rights by government agents gives the
victim an implied cause of action for damages. A Bivens claim “employs the tort
principle of proximate causation.”266 However in this case, “the actions taken by
Hagenbeck and Rapp were too attenuated from Doe’s rape to be a proximate cause
of her injuries,”267 compelling the Due Process claim’s dismissal.
But, in Judge Hellerstein’s words, “Doe’s equal protection claim is
different.”268 The court found that Feres did not bar a finding of monetary action
because the alleged actions were too unrelated to military service. Having cleared
that hurdle, the opinion addresses the merits of the claim: Quoting Justice
Ginsberg’s opinion in United States v. Virginia,269 the Court concluded, “Doe’s equal
protection claim is that she was denied her constitutionally-protected right to an
‘equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based
on [her] individual talents and capacities.’”270 Given the substantial facts Doe
alleged,271 Doe sufficiently stated a cause of action: if true, these facts indicate
“Hagenbeck and Rapp were indifferent to their constitutional and statutory
obligations to foster equal conditions and equal protection between male and
female cadets.”272 Subsequently, the Court concluded that Doe’s “equal protection
claim . . . ha[d] sufficient legal basis to withstand Defendants’ motion to
dismiss.”273
D. The Second Circuit’s Reversal and Remand
More than two years after the trial court’s ruling, a Second Circuit panel ruled
on the government’s appeal.274 Resting heavily on three Supreme Court cases,

has sued prior cadets successfully when they failed to reimburse the United States in accordance with
the contract’s terms” (citing United States v. China, 2007 WL 775615 (D.S.C. Mar. 8, 2007); United States
v. Chrzanowski, 358 F.Supp.2d 693 (N.D.Ill. 2005); O’Rourke v. Dep’t of Air Force, 2005 WL 3088611
(N.D.Ohio Nov. 16, 2005))).
264. Id. Instead, Judge Hellerstein concluded that the violation is a “claim sounding in tort,” which
is explicitly prohibited by the Tucker Act. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)(2)).
265. 403 U.S. 388.
266. Doe, 98 F.Supp.3d at 687 (citing Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 175 (2d Cir. 2007)).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (adjudicating the constitutionality of the Virginia Military Institute’s
single-sex student body under the Equal Protection Clause).
270. Doe, 98 F.Supp.3d at 687 (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532).
271. See supra notes 247–249 and accompanying text.
272. Doe, 98 F.Supp.3d at 688.
273. Id. at 689.
274. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017).
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Chappell v. Wallace,275 United States v. Shearer,276 and United States v. Stanley,277 the
panel held that Doe’s injuries did arise from her military service and were thus
barred by Feres.278
First, the panel noted the Supreme Court’s explicit cautioning against
extending Bivens remedies, as laid out in Chappell: “The Court, in Bivens and its
progeny, has expressly cautioned, however, that such a remedy will not be
available when ‘special factors counselling [sic] hesitation’ are present.”279 In
Chappell, the Court found two such factors: first, Congress’s decision to explicitly
exclude military-based injuries in the FTCA’s language.280 Second, that “[t]he
special nature of military life – the need for unhesitating and decisive action by
military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel – would
be undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing officers to personal
liability at the hands of those they are charged to command.”281 In Shearer, the
Court reaffirmed this principle.282 The Stanley Court, in adjudicating yet another
analogous claim, held that by the same reasoning such a suit “require[s]
abstention.”283
Based on this precedent, the court read the complaint, as “lead[ing]
ineluctably to the conclusion that Doe cannot maintain her Bivens claim.”284 The
majority was convinced by Doe’s status as a cadet, the nature of West Point itself,
and context surrounding the alleged injuries:
The allegations in Doe’s Amended Complaint do not merely invite, but
require a most wide-ranging inquiry into the commands of Lieutenant
General Hagenbeck and Brigadier General Rapp. Specifically, as they relate
to these defendants’ conduct, Doe’s allegations center on the implementation
and supervision of allegedly inadequate and harmful training and education
programs relating to sexual assault and harassment; on the alleged failure to
provide properly both for the report and investigation of sexual assault
claims, and for the support of cadets who are assaulted; on the alleged lack of
sufficient numbers of female faculty and administrators at West Point and on
the failure to recruit female cadets; on the allegedly inadequate punishment
meted out not only to perpetrators of sexual violence but also to those who
engage in misogynistic chants, slurs and comments; and, most broadly, on the
assertedly culpable tolerance of a hostile culture toward women at West
Point. Adjudicating such a money damages claim would require a civilian
court to engage in searching fact-finding about Lieutenant General

275. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
276. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
277. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
278. See generally Doe, 870 F.3d 36.
279. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298 (internal citations omitted).
280. See id. at 304.
281. Id. See also id. (“Taken together, the unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment
and Congress’ activity in the field constitute ‘special factors’ which dictate that it would be
inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against [other military
personnel].”).
282. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55–59 (1985).
283. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987).
284. Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 2017).
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Hagenbeck and Brigadier General Rapp’s “basic choices about the discipline,
supervision, and control” of the cadets that they were responsible for training
as future officers. In such circumstances, we conclude that Chappell and
Stanley squarely foreclose Doe’s Bivens claim.285

Next, the majority addressed and disposed of Doe’s counterarguments head
on, primarily Doe’s reliance on United States v. Virginia (VMI),286 which mandated
the Virginia Military Institute, a state-run military college, open its doors to female
students. The Second Circuit held that “VMI is simply not germane to the remedial
inquiry” because Hagenbeck and Rapp argued only that “the remedy of money
damages is unavailable to members of the armed services for violations of those
rights where Congress has not acted and the incident-to-service rule is satisfied”
rather than moving to dismiss the case based on equal protection defenses. Thus,
the court found VMI to be inapposite.287
Lastly, the court tackled the argument of whether Doe’s injuries arose
incident to her military service, as well as her—and the dissent’s—reliance on
Taber v. Maine.288 In Taber, one off-duty serviceman injured another while driving
drunk.289 But, according to the Doe panel, Taber turned on “whether a person in
Taber’s position would be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits on the
theory that when injured he was engaged in activities that ‘fell within the scope of
[his] military employment.’”290 Thus, the Doe court viewed Taber as inapposite
because it applied only to cases in which the servicemembers would not otherwise
be entitled to damages under the FTCA if the incident occurred in civilian life (as
servicemembers driving off-duty and off-base would not be entitled to damages
on FTCA claims, whereas servicemembers assaulted on a base while on duty
would be).291
Lastly, the Doe panel argued that Taber didn’t apply because that case lacked
specific indicia of command discretion. The Taber panel held that “the incident-toservice rule (regardless of workers’ compensation considerations) is properly
invoked when adjudicating the claim of a service member would require
‘commanding officers . . . to stand prepared to convince a civilian court of the
wisdom of a wide range of military and disciplinary decisions.’”292 The Doe
majority felt that Taber did not apply because unlike the plaintiff in Taber, Jane Doe
would need to call military officials as witnesses and have a civilian court and jury
adjudge principles of military wisdom.293

285. Id. (internal citations omitted).
286. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
287. Doe, 870 F.3d at 46–47. Seeking power in numbers, the court also noted that its conclusion is
“consistent with the recent decisions of at least two other circuits,” citing the two most recent challenges
to Feres adjudicated and dismissed by sister circuits—Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 551 (4th Cir.
2012), and Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
288. 67 F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1995).
289. Id. at 1032.
290. Doe, 870 F.3d at 47 (citing Taber v. Maine, 67 F. 3d 1029, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995)).
291. Id.
292. Taber v. Maine, 67 F. 3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58
(1985)).
293. Doe, 870 F.3d at 48.
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E. Judge Chin’s Dissent
Judge Denny Chin dissented from the panel’s holding, resting primarily on
the nature of the incident and the circuit’s precedent under Taber.
First, Judge Chin spoke on the nature of Equal Protection claims broadly. The
Equal Protection clause, he wrote, does not just protect a minority student’s
acceptance or matriculation to a university “but to the continued treatment of
students after they have been admitted”294; such principles, he explains, have been
applied to the military and military institutions.295 Judge Chin cites several Army
“regulations [that] address the issue of gender discrimination and sexual
harassment.”296 Therefore, he believed that “Doe was entitled, under the Fifth
Amendment and the Army’s own regulations, to an environment free from gender
discrimination and sexual harassment.”297
Next, the dissent attacked Feres’s application via two prior Second Circuit
cases: Taber and Wake v. United States.298 In Taber, a drunken sailor on liberty
collided with another sailor in an automobile accident.299 Upon hearing an FTCA
claim related to the accident, the Second Circuit concluded “the link between
Taber’s activity when he was injured and his military status is too frail to support
a Feres bar.”300 In Wake—adjudicated the following year—an enlisted Navy
reservist and member of the reserve officer training corps (“ROTC”) was injured
in another automobile accident; her car, driven by a Marine Corps sergeant, was
taking her and other ROTC students back from their precommissioning physical
exam, a requisite step to become an officer.301 Importantly, Wake held that courts
ought to examine “the totality of the germane facts.”302 “In examining whether a
service member’s injuries were incurred ’incident to service,’ the courts consider
various factors, with no single factor being dispositive”303:
[T]he relationship of the activity to the individual’s membership in the
service, as well as the location of the conduct giving rise to the underlying tort
claim . . . Also relevant is whether the activity is limited to military personnel
and whether the service member was taking advantage of a privilege or
enjoying a benefit conferred as a result of military service.304

294. Id. at 54 (Chen, J., dissenting) (citing Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 258
(2009)).
295. Id. (Chen, J., dissenting) (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); VMI, 518 U.S.
at 535–36, 547–54; Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)).
296. Id. 54–55.
297. Id. at 55.
298. 89 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996).
299. 67 F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1995).
300. Id. at 1050.
301. Wake v. United States, 89 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1996).
302. Id. at 57.
303. Id. at 58.
304. Id. at 58.
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As Judge Chin applied the facts of the case,305 he found Feres inapplicable.
First, as to the activities immediately preceding Doe’s rape, her ultimate
injury, she was engaged in purely recreational activity: she was out for an
evening walk on a college campus, after curfew, with another student who
was a friend. Second, as to her broader activities at West Point, she was a
student attending college: she was taking classes, participating in
extracurricular activities, and learning to grow up and to be a self-sufficient
and healthy individual. . . . There was ”nothing characteristically
military” about what she was doing, and her injuries did not arise out of
military employment.306

Additionally, Judge Chin believed that “the ‘special factors counseling
hesitation’ in the intramilitary immunity cases” were not implicated:
First, Doe’s claims do not implicate ”delicate questions involving military
discipline.” Her claims do not call into question “the military judgments and
decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the military
mission.” The actions and decisions of the individual defendants being
challenged here do not implicate, except perhaps in the most abstract sense,
military discipline or military judgment or military preparation. . . . Second,
the ”federal system of military death and disability benefits” established by
Congress for injuries sustained by military personnel incident to service,
apparently is not available to Doe. . . . Third, the district court’s decision to
permit Doe to proceed with her federal constitutional claim does not implicate
the Court’s concern that a “uniform federal scheme” not be displaced by ”the
contingencies of local tort law.”307

And finally, Judge Chin offered compelling distinctions of Doe’s allegations
and the cases the majority relied upon, ranging from the type and nature of the
incident to remedies available to complainants in those cases.308 Ultimately,
however, this reasoning could not swing a second vote on the panel.
F. Why Doe Matters
Had Judge Hellerstein’s ruling held up, it would have been an important
development for servicewomen everywhere, the first significant chink in the Feres
doctrine’s armor. The Circuit court’s reversal and remand, however, only serves
to broaden Feres’ reach.
As in cases cited above,309 whether to apply Feres remains a threshold issue.
Specifically, Feres’ applicability to a rape on a school campus—a blatantly nonmilitary action—presents the opportunity to recast what conduct arises out of
one’s military service. This is especially so because “the primary reason for
exercising judicial restraint with cases concerning the military is ‘the need to

305. Which, on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, are presumed true. Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d
36, 39 n.1 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 742 F.3d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 2014)).
306. Id. at 59 (Chin, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 57 (Chin, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
308. Id. at 58–61 (Chin, J., dissenting). For example, Judge Chin noted the other service academybased cases whose plaintiffs, in his opinion, sustained injuries far more related to their military service.
309. See supra Part II.D.iv.a.
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preserve the military disciplinary structure and prevent judicial involvement in
sensitive military matters.’”310
But Hagenbeck’s application of Feres to the conduct in question—the hostile
and gender-discriminatory environment—was adjudged first and foremost by its
military context rather than the nature or purpose of the incident giving rise to the
cause of action. A purposivist reinterpretation looking primarily at the gendered
treatment of those involved—as Judges Chin and Hellerstein saw it—would pry
open the door for female servicewomen in other contexts who can similarly plead
gender discrimination or sexual assault without having the claim be barred simply
because it transpired in a military setting.
Instead, the force and reach of the bar only grew, as the Second Circuit held
that the relevance of the military context trumps other factors. Doe is important as
the Court was presented with an opportunity to clarify and narrow Feres’s reach
but instead made it more difficult to achieve justice for aggrieved service
members. Thus, in essence “[t]he law demanding a woman’s entry through the
schoolhouse gates . . . abandon[s] its protection beyond the gates[.]”311 As Judge
Chin concluded in dissent, “While we do not, of course, have the authority to
overrule Feres, we should not be extending the doctrine. By holding that Doe’s
injuries sustained as a cadet incident to being a student are barred as injuries
incident to military service, the majority does precisely that.”312
CONCLUSION
American women have long fought for the right to fight for their country.
They have continued to break glass ceiling after glass ceiling simply for the chance
to risk their lives defending both genders’ freedoms.313 This fact alone should
compel us to ask what we are doing to help safeguard these soldiers of misfortune.
This article began by tracking women’s limited—but growing—history in the
military, noting the different milestones they have achieved along the way. The
article next turned to military sexual assault itself, discussing its prevalence,
national security implications and important, how assault is prosecuted—or not.
The prosecution, as detailed, has untold obstacles to seeing perpetrators brought
to justice.
Next, the article looked at remedies, both realized and potential: first,
detailing a few affirmative steps the military has taken to bring women to equal
standing in the military at large. Then, the essay reviewed certain changes to the
military justice system itself, which has shown some marked improvements. But
these changes do not in any way suggest that the push is over: unfortunately, much
work remains undone for women to fully gain equal footing in the military. Part
of this work includes a more thorough and earnest prosecution of sexual assault,
310. Doe v. Hagenbeck, 98 F. Supp. 3d. 672, 687–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Wake v. United States,
89 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1996)).
311. Id. at 689.
312. Doe, 870 F.3d at 61–62 (2d Cir. 2017) (Chin, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (citing Lombard
v. United States, 690 F.2d 215, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“While lower courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Feres, they are hardly obliged
to extend the limitation . . . .”)).
313. See supra Part I. In Pursuit of Social Change: Women’s Pursuit of Military Equality
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which plagues women at nearly five times the rate of men. This article has tried to
proffer a few suggestions as to how to sufficiently tinker with the legal
mechanisms such that victims may finally see their attackers brought to justice.
*****
To be sure, the march for women to gain genuine equality in the eyes of our
armed forces is, at best, a slog. It can and will deplete and exasperate the most
perseverant and steadfast among us. This is no different for those aiming to see
the day in which a pervasive societal norm is changed. The yardstick for such
progress is measured in generations, if not centuries. As Dr. King said, the “arc of
the moral universe is long.”
Much work remains to keep this arc ever-bending toward justice—in this
case, women’s equality in the military. This essay has aimed to cover one niche of
this multi-faceted battle, military sexual assault, and I simultaneously encourage
others to take up the mantle in other similarly important realms.
Make no mistake, the suggestions discussed—and others that will arise as
needed—will be every inch as hard to pass, if not harder, than those that have
come before them. Not only are prevailing attitudes about women’s inferior
suitability for military service ever present, but also those already reluctant to
change will undoubtedly take the attitude that those fighting for progress have
already gotten what they sought, being ever more indignant at demand for further
reform. This intractability simply cannot deter those in pursuit of change because
without them, progress will always remain at arm’s length. What’s more, if these
corrections languish unenacted en masse, we tacitly permit the further
perpetration of these attacks and, more broadly, inhibit the development we seek.,
by letting these status-driven crimes go unabated, we only encourage the cycle of
subservient attitudes and perpetuate wrongdoings including but not limited to
sexual assault.
Let us all begin bending history’s arc by standing up for the rights of those
who risk their lives protecting our way of life.

